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Abstract
The concept of nature plays a key role in the thought of Hannah Arendt, though it has not been
explored to the same degree as other elements of her political theory, even when the latter is
employed in environmental political thought. This paper seeks to rectify this oversight, showing
that the concept of nature is imbedded in Arendt’s conception of the political—not merely one
issue among others—and thus has a more complex part to play in environmental thinking than is
generally assumed. The first chapter of the paper lays exposes the phenomenological core of the
concept of nature in Arendt’s thought,  showing how it  is  intertwined with her views on the
human condition. The second chapter explores Arendt’s notion of world alienation as a feature of
modernity, resulting in a new concept of nature as the object of scientific inquiry. The subsequent
manipulation of this concept by totalitarian regimes is accorded a separate section in chapter 2.
In the third chapter, the emergence of the inherent value of life as a principle guiding modern
society is analyzed with a view to showing how the naturalization of human beings paradoxically
threatens the natural world. The conclusion deals with Arendt’s theory of the political value of
promising, arguing that it is among the most helpful tools available to environmental politics
given the historical context in which action currently takes place. Throughout, the emphasis is on
the need for  direct  and embodied relationships  to the natural  and human environments  as a
precondition  for  human  plurality.  While  many  of  Arendt’s  ideas  give  only  one  side  of  the
contemporary  predicament,  they  are  explored  here  in  depth  so  as  to  make  connections  and
criticisms more accessible to future scholarship,  as well  as to situate the context of political
responses to environmental issues today. 
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Foreword
By exploring in depth one particular thinker whose interests in many ways match my own, I have
endeavoured to find an appropriate lens through which to meet the goals set out in my Plan of
Study.  Hannah  Arendt  combines  phenomenology,  political  theory,  and  historiography  in  her
studies  of  the  contemporary  moment.  Thus,  through  her  thinking,  I  have  engaged  with  the
various disciplinary methods I set out to explore. In terms of phenomenology, I opted to follow
Arendt’s focus on the human, instead of singling out the phenomenology of water, but I steered
the emphasis toward human relations with the environment. In stressing Arendt’s understanding
of nature as “swinging,” I was influenced by my earlier preoccupation with the nature of flow
stemming from a preoccupation with water. While infrastructure anthropology does not appear in
Arendt’s work, I dedicated significant space in my writing to her writings on technology and its
influence  on  human  social  organization.  I  dwelt  at  particular  length  on  the  question  of
appearance  and  the  role  of  technological  systems  in  disrupting  our  connection  to  sensory
experience. Further, I theorized how her thinking on “action into nature” could be applied to
contemporary  telecommunications  networks  as  a  process  of  rewriting  the  communicative
potential of the airways. Concerning economics, Arendt offers an alternative reading of Marx and
the tradition of political economy, which I explored in connection to the concept of nature. I
stressed the “ecological economics” angle of her discussions on the labouring society and the
transformation of the public realm into a social  domain for the protection of private wealth.
While I emphasized the natural environment component of my plan of study, I took into account
its intertwinement with the built environment, which belongs to Arendt’s concept of “world,” as
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Dearest Mary: The Kant quote: In German “Die schönen Dinge 
zeigen an, dass er Mensch in die Welt passe und selbst seine 
Anschauung der Dinge mit den Gesetzen seiner Anschauung 
stimme.” [...] Rough translation: “The beautiful things in the 
world (meaning natural things) indicate that man is made for and 
fits into the world and that his perception of things agrees with the
laws of perception.” 
It was good to hear your voice. I keep thinking of you. 
Hannah
Hannah Arendt
Letter of November 14, 1970 to Mary McCarthy1
Darling Hannah, 
Yesterday about 8 p.m. I finished my novel. In the ultimate 
version your Kant quotation is in. I thought of a way. And I’ve 
found a marvel for the dedication page. Wait and see. 
Mary McCarthy




Mary McCarthy  dedicated  her  1971 novel  Birds  of  America to  her  longtime  friend  Hannah
Arendt. Quoting Karl Jaspers, another of Arendt’s friends, it reads:
“…to attempt to embody the Idea in an example, as one might embody the wise
man in a novel, is unseemly… for our natural limitations, which persistently
interfere  with  the  perfection  of  the  Idea,  forbid  all  illusion  about  such  an
attempt.” 
To Hannah3
The gesture was appreciated, with Arendt writing that the dedication would be “a great lasting
joy.”4 The novel, which recounts the confrontation of an earnest American boy with high ethical
standards and a changing natural and social landscape, was poorly received by critics. But Arendt
saw something valuable in it  beyond the personal consideration.  “This nature novel,” as she
called it, “old fashioned at first glance, strikes me as the most ‘relevant’ piece of fiction one
could possibly read, hitting this whole technological question of the time at its most human and
most  neglected  point.”5 Importantly,  here  as  elsewhere,  it  is  clear  that  for  Arendt  the
technological question is related to concerns about nature.6 In the final scene of the novel, the
protagonist, Peter, convalesces in a Paris hospital when he is visited by a vision of his mentor,
Kant, who declares to him: “Nature is dead, mein kind.”7
Arendt had supplied McCarthy with images of Kant to flesh out her physical description
of him, as well as the quote that McCarthy would use to set up her pithy closer. The quote,
above, is taken from a note Kant scribbled on a letter he received from an acquaintance.8 In her
translation of the quote, Arendt inserts her interpretation of the “beautiful things in the world” to
3 McCarthy 1971, dedication page. Italicized in original. 
4 BF 277.
5 BF 277. 
6 E.g. HC 148. 
7 McCarthy 1971, 344. 
8 The letter, from Markus Herz dated 9 July 1771, can be found in the correspondence section of the Akademie 
Ausgabe edition of Kant’s works, vol. X, 68, p.124-27. Kant’s note can be found in the miscellaneous notes 
section, under “Logic,” vol. XVI, 1820a, p.127. 
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mean “natural things.” However, neither the note nor the letter seems to suggest any obvious
relation between the beautiful and the natural.  Nonetheless, it  is Arendt’s contention that the
natural things, and our perception of them (perhaps as beautiful), are what prove our belonging
to the world.  By contrast,  McCarthy’s dedication,  which takes from Jaspers’ own reading of
Kant,9 suggests that nature is what prevents us from belonging exclusively to the Idea. Here,
then, are two different readings of Kant: We all belong to the world by virtue of being natural;
yet by the same token our relation to the ideal is limited. What can this mean, then, if Kant is
presented as the messenger of nature’s death? Does it mean that we have left behind the world
and live as strangers on this planet? Or is it that we now have complete access to the ideal realm
and are now finally free to bring the perfection of the Idea into the here and now? Maybe these
are the same thing, after all. And what role did technology have in this development?
These reflections emerge today in the context of accelerating climate change and species
extinction, events which could be, and have been, formulated as the death of nature.10 Ours is a
situation of environmental crisis if we agree with Arendt that a crisis means “we have lost the
answers on which we ordinarily rely without even realizing they were originally answers to
questions. A crisis forces us back to the questions themselves and requires from us either new or
old answers, but in any case direct judgments,” and surely the ideological and technological
approaches to  the natural  environment  of  the past  century appear  increasingly inadequate to
contemporary problems.11 A crisis is not simply one problem, but a deeper disjunction that makes
itself  felt  in  many domains;  as  such the environmental  crisis  is  not  simply one issue,  but  a
fundamental  misjudgment  about  how  to  deal  with  the  natural  that  leads  to  a  series  of
environmental problems felt by different beings at different places. Arendt felt that crises were
9 Cf. BF 279. 
10 As in, for example, McKibben 1989, one of the first popular books on global warming. 
11 BPF 174. 
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opportunities to reevaluate these questions and consider new answers, and it is my conjecture
that reflecting on Arendt’s thought can illuminate aspects of our environmental crisis.  While
Arendt  was  likely  unaware  of  the  specific  dangers  emerging  now,  it  would  seem  she  saw
environmental  crisis  even  in  her  own  time.  Her  correspondence  with  McCarthy  reveals  a
preoccupation with the state of nature that is everywhere present but often obscured in her major
writings.12 
Two complementary beliefs motivate this paper. The first is that the concept of nature
plays a far greater role in the thought of Hannah Arendt than is ordinarily recognized, and that an
appreciation  for  the  specific  way she  understands  the  concept  of  nature  will  illuminate  her
political theory to an important degree. The second is that, through both this understanding of
nature  as  well  as  her  political  theory  in  general,  Arendt’s  thinking  can  make  important
contributions to the discourse on environmental issues and climate change that are infrequently
heard. My hope is that this paper will come to the aid of thinkers wishing to engage more deeply
with  Arendt’s  thought  as  well  as  add a  valuable  perspective  to  contemporary  approaches  to
dealing with impending environmental catastrophes. To me, these two efforts have been linked in
my daily life. To others, at best this paper will convince them that, as Arendt often suggested, to
think can be an important  way of being active in the world and that phenomenological  and
historical clarity is a powerful tool in the effort to challenge a regime of ecological devastation.
However, I make no attempts to tell readers how to apply these ideas. 
Many scholars, beginning in the 1990s, have turned to Arendt’s work for insight into the
environmental crisis.  There are two major sets of discussions about the relevance of Arendt’s
12 Even the letters are not fully explicit, making reference to an ongoing conversation the two writers carried out in
the time they spent together over many years. This hidden conversation (ephemeral, as Arendt likes to remark 
on the nature of speech) makes appearances in their respective writing, like geysers announcing an underground 
stream. They are both clearly influenced by one another though on many points they diverge. Thus, I 
occasionally use McCarthy’s ideas to illustrate Arendt’s thought. 
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work to environmental thought. On the one hand, there is a group of authors who use her ideas
on labour and work to critique the impact economic activity has had on the natural environment.
Their  main  concern  is  with  “productivism,”  meaning  the  incessant  growth  demanded  by  a
capitalist economy, and they reference Arendt’s comments on the waste economy, obsolescence,
consumption, and the labouring society.13 Paul Voice is representative of this group, stating that
his mission is “to distinguish an Arendtian view of environmental sustainability that differs in
important ways from the usual interpretations of this notion.”14 These thinkers typically rely on
Arendt’s account of the vita activa to make general arguments about how the economy fails to
consider externalities. However, by suggesting that, according to Arendt, “the human condition is
disordered,”  they  misread  Arendt  as  proposing  some  “correct”  way  to  order  society.15
Furthermore,  they  tend  to  neglect  the  question  as  to  how  and  why  the  economy  became
structured in such an unsustainable way, on which points Arendt is perhaps most helpful. 
On the other hand, there is a looser group of scholars who focus on the possibility of
making environmental issues political. Some are more interested in technology and “action into
nature;”16 others with the difficulty in organizing action around issues like climate change which
lack the visibility to appear in public.17 Thus, Jill Hargis writes that “Arendt provides an outline
of political action upon which environmental thinkers can draw to theorize politics and empower
people to act.”18 And while her understanding of Arendtian politics and its use for contemporary
environmental issues is of high calibre, a conceptual gap remains between Arendt’s observations
on nature and her political theories. There is no evidence in these authors of how Arendt’s ideas
about nature are linked to her political theory as a whole. 
13 See Whiteside 1994; Szerszynski 2003; Ott 2009;  Constable 2013; Voice 2016.
14 Voice 2016, 179. 
15 Voice 2016, 182. 
16 See Cooper 1988; Macauley 1992; Smith 2006. For a definition of this concept, see chapter 3 below. 
17 See Whiteside 1998; Sandilands 1999; Torgerson 1999; Bowring 2014; Greear 2016; Hargis 2016.
18 Hargis 2016, 476.
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In  both  groups,  finally,  most  of  these  commentators  settle  for  asking  Arendt
straightforward questions and drawing out a few key concepts to try to answer them in a neat and
tidy way. More often than not,  scholars import  their  own frameworks and attribute  terms to
Arendt  that  she  would  not  have  used.  And  while  they  agree  on  the  importance  of  “world
alienation,” a key concept in Arendt’s understanding of modernity, they tend to lack the historical
awareness that was at  the core of everything Arendt wrote.19 That said,  the insights of these
scholars are of great value and I will therefore try not to cover the same ground, though much
overlap  is  inevitable.  In  this  paper,  I  work  through Arendt’s  major  texts,  showing how the
concept  of nature is  threaded through each of these concerns.20 In my view, the two sets  of
discussions in the scholarly literature are intricately related in Arendt’s thought, and can be better
understood according to the historical framework within which Arendt operates and which gives
meaning to her various ideas. Thus, while this paper reiterates some of the same insights as those
of others, my conclusion differs dramatically from those of others since it takes into account the
context in which Arendt’s ideas must necessarily be placed.
Additionally, I have chosen to pursue an “immanent thinking” approach to the study of
Arendt’s thought. Rather than adapt Arendtian categories to our contemporary predicament, I
prefer instead to delve as deeply as I can into Arendt’s own way of thinking through related
topics, in order to come out with some ways of thinking through our present situation as she
might have. This method I learned from the great scholar Jean Trouillard, whose masterful study
of Plotinus,  La purification plotinienne, I had the fortune to translate. Trouillard describes his
method as follows:
19 Especially Macauley 1992; Whiteside 1998; Greear 2016.
20 Eichmann in Jerusalem is notably absent in this paper. A separate chapter on the connections between evil, 
violence, and nature would be a valuable extension of the topic treated here and would profit from the insights 
of that work, but was unfeasible given the constraints surrounding the writing of this paper. 
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to understand a philosophical work requires a double effort. One must awake in
oneself the exigency from which all reflection proceeds, without which one is
blind.  One must  espouse the particular  form this  exigency has taken in  the
thinker one wishes to understand, by continually immersing oneself  in their
thought, and allowing it to take root. This is a work of deepening and openness,
which leads us to pose our problems to the author in order to enter more and
more into her own, to see with her eyes, restoring her reality and perspective to
their authentic significance.21 
I  seek  to  restore  Arendt’s  own  thinking  on  the  concept  of  nature,  that  is,  to  view  the
contemporary environmental situation through the questions she would have asked, rather than
asking her to answer my own questions. When a topic arises that has been treated in greater
detail  or  with greater  acuity by another  scholar,  I  make reference  to  them in  the notes,  but
otherwise I limit myself as closely as possible to Arendt’s own words. 
To  understand  how  Arendt  registered  environmental  concerns,  it  is  necessary  to
appreciate the particular way she understood the concept of nature. Arendt relies on a concept of
nature to inform her wider view of the human condition, though she never turns to it as explicitly
as she turns, for example, to education or science. The closest she comes to a direct engagement
with the concept is in “The Concept of History: Ancient and Modern” in which it serves as a foil
to the titular subject, but even here we do not find the complete picture.22 As a result, retrieving
this  concept  requires  a  bit  of  archaeology.  It  also  requires  some conjecture,  or  rather  some
creative cross-referencing. In my reconstruction, I have traced the concept through three distinct
stages:  phenomenological  definition,  object  of  scientific  inquiry,  and societal  value.  Each of
these forms the basis for a discrete chapter.  
Like all concepts, for Arendt, nature finds its original, distinct meaning in experience,
and as a result I look to her phenomenological writings to clarify this stage. The major text for
21 Trouillard forthcoming (my thanks to Liz Curry-King, my partner in translation). I have changed the pronouns 
to reflect my particular case. 
22 BPF 41-90.
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this analysis is of course The Human Condition, whose central chapters attempt to illustrate an
experiential distinction between the activities of which humans are capable: labour, work, and
action.  As  I  relate  in  chapter  1,  Arendt  finds  proof  of  this  distinction  in  language,  which,
harkening to a pre-alienated world, reveals in its etymology the authentic meaning of words. In
my reading, I find that the concept of nature emerges from the phenomenological experience of
human solidarity with other creatures and cycles. It is the domain to which we belong by virtue
of being bodily, and whose patterns are discovered in the intercourse of our biological life with
other human and non-human living beings; in short,  it  is the horizon according to which we
understand ourselves in labour. But if we sense our participation in the natural realm by virtue of
being labourers, at the same time we recognize our separation from that realm by the activities of
work and action, thus discovering that we are not wholly natural, or rather that we are both
natural and unnatural. I then explore some ways in which human beings interact with nature
through these various activities, emphasizing especially the political process by which human
beings decide collectively how to organize their relationship with nature. 
The second stage concerns the transformations undergone in the context of growing
world alienation, which is the subject of chapter 2 and appears in two parts.  Over the course of
the modern age, the set of phenomena that was encompassed by the term “nature” is cut off from
its direct experience in the body and, while it continues to bear the name, this “natural” sphere
comes to be defined by the conjectures and findings of experimental science. This removal from
the human scale of meaning and understanding recasts nature as a discrete entity, a category
against which others, like culture, are qualified. It becomes the object of dispute and argument,
as scientists, philosophers, and demagogues attempt to circumscribe the “laws” that govern its
movement,  rather than the principles by which it  is  conceived.  This scientific  conception of
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nature was influenced equally by the discovery or change in attitude by Europeans towards other
continents;  the  emergence  of  capitalism in  the  public  domain;  and the  rising  importance  of
technologies  that  replaced the  senses  as  the  primary  intermediary  between mind and world,
beginning  with  Galileo’s  use  of  the  telescope.  It  produced  an  abstract  concept  of  nature,
conceived as a process either opposed to human and cultural life or completely subsuming it. As
I discuss in the second part, this concept would ultimately lend itself to ideological manipulation
and  form the  basis  for  a  new mode of  political  organization—totalitarianism.  Such regimes
would discover the full potential of “the force of distance” inherent in alienation by learning to
change nature itself. 
The last stage, which I explore in chapter 3, is more extrapolation than reconstruction. I
read in Arendt’s analysis of the contemporary view of “life as the highest good” a transformation
of the concept of nature into an ideal that takes absolute priority in human affairs. I argue that
placing life above all other values has led us both to ignore our specifically human need of
worldliness and to organize our societies for the sole purpose of extending the life process of
humankind. While the social organization of humanity has transformed us into a kind of invasive
species, our capacity to unleash processes has been turned against nature to try to write death out
of existence. This single-minded pursuit has in turn led to many of the environmental issues we
currently face,  from climate change, biodiversity loss, and ocean acidification, to accelerated
mutations, soil erosion, and resource depletion. I show that the same ideal that is at the source of
destructive behaviours with regards to the environment organizes society in such a way as to
incapacitate political action on these same issues.
In  conclusion,  like  other  scholars,  I  develop  my  own  Arendt-inspired  approach  to
addressing  the  environmental  crisis.  I  offer  this  contribution  as  a  supplement  to  the  many
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important approaches that will be required in the coming years. I argue for the value of political
promising, which gains importance in the modern, alienated world as a means of re-establishing
spaces  of  political  solidarity,  which  can  be  foundational  in  developing  a  contemporary
environmental politics. The clearest prototype Arendt provides for this is in her analysis of the
early  American  system of  covenants,  by  which  individual  persons  bind  themselves  together
around a shared experience of wilderness. 
Arendt’s ideas shed light on facets of the concept of nature that are obscured in its daily
usage,  but  they are not without  fault.  Her analyses bear  resonances with parallel  discourses,
especially  work done under  the rubric  of  biopolitics,  but  are  subject  to criticism from other
important fields of inquiry. Thus, for example, in her judgments on the life-value inherent in
contemporary society, she fails to recognize that not all lives are considered equally valuable; the
locus of “life” tends to shift from the individual to the society when the lives of marginalized
people interfere with the smooth operation of a system imbued with White Supremacy, as the
theorists of necropolitics would argue.23 Arendt tends to universalize her notions of the human,
life, and nature, centering Eurowestern experiences as representative of those of all peoples.24 In
her dedication to a common world which makes plurality possible, she tends to neglect that for
many, the world to which she harkens was based on exclusion. These criticisms are no doubt
deserving of more room than I am here giving them, but I am obliged by the constraints of this
paper to leave them to the side. By placing the analysis within a historical framework, I try to
emphasize the limited scope of Arendt’s terminology and I endeavour to make clear that a post-
alienation common world will have to be built through collaboration between people of many
backgrounds and with the recognition of the partiality of Eurowestern contributions.
23 E.g. Mbembe 2003.
24 Her starting point on human experience, to the exclusion of non-human entities, is itself a point of contention 
with scholars of the post-humanist stream. 
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Much as I might like to be teasing out perfectly distinct strands from the complicated
knot Arendt has tied, the more accurate picture is that I am merely reorganizing that knot in a
new shape in such a way as to emphasize one particular segment of it, namely the concept of
nature. If I stitch together some strings under the name phenomenology, and others under the
name alienation, etc., it is only because, to me, these have seemed the best arrangements under
which to reveal the many loops and bows in which nature is wound in Arendt’s thought. Or, to
use a different metaphor, it is as though one were to flip a tapestry upside down, revealing how a
single cord,  by winding its  secret  way from one place to  another,  managed to find itself  at
numerous discontinuous points on the front. My task then becomes one of showing why in each
of its appearances it happened to take on certain shapes or maintain certain associations with
other cords. 
I  suggested above that  we are facing an environmental  crisis,  in  Arendt’s sense,  on
multiple fronts but especially on that of climate change. If this is the case, we cannot merely
repackage the solutions that have worked (or, at best, postponed the crisis) in the past. As Arendt
writes, “a crisis becomes a disaster only when we respond to it with preformed judgments, that
is,  with  prejudices.  Such  an  attitude  not  only  sharpens  the  crisis  but  makes  us  forfeit  the
experience of reality and the opportunity for reflection it provides.”25 I see the present situation as
not devoid of hope and I have tried to respond to it as an opportunity for reflection as Arendt did
her own crises. It has often been pointed out that Arendt, in a speech delivered shortly before her
death, spoke of the “ray of hope” that was the burgeoning environmental movement.26 Less well-
known is the epigraph that remained in her typewriter upon her death, waiting to accompany the
final work that would never be completed, Judging. The quote, from Goethe, reads: “If I could
25 BPF 174-75. 
26 HTR 262. 
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rid my path of magic, / could totally unlearn its incantations, / confront you, Nature, simply as a
man, / to be a human being would then be worth the effort.”27 If a crisis provides an experience of
reality that has been obscured by prejudicial lenses up until now, can it be that the environmental
crisis gives us a glimpse into nature that we had forgotten? Could Arendt have felt that, at the end
of her life, the magic spells obfuscating our view of Nature were beginning to dissipate, that we
were beginning to encounter nature again with our own simple senses, and that this revealed that
the natural things in the world are in fact beautiful? And can it be that by relinquishing our desire
for the “Ideal,” and embracing our “natural limitations,” in all their beauty, we will come to
belong in the world once more?




Many contemporary ideas about nature derive from modern science, just as our understanding of
the environmental crisis is mediated by the diagnoses of experts. Unfortunately, in the modern
world, we can no longer understand the knowledge produced by and received from science as
experiences of appearance available to all. As Arendt points out, science has a tendency towards
ever  greater  technical  precision in  its  language,  thus  retreating from the domain of  ordinary
language which centers on experiences common to all. This loss of a common language in which
to discuss issues of shared concern now extends to all fields of knowledge. As Arendt describes
the situation,
There exists, however, a silent agreement in most discussions among political
and  social  scientists  that  we  can  ignore  distinctions  and  proceed  on  the
assumption  that  everything can  eventually  be called  anything else,  and that
distinctions are meaningful only to the extent that each of us has the right “to
define his terms.” Yet does not this curious right, which we have come to grant
as soon as we deal with matters of importance—as though it were actually the
same as the right to one’s own opinion—already indicate that such terms as
‘tyranny,’ ‘authority,’ ‘totalitarianism’ have simply lost their common meaning,
or that we have ceased to live in a common world where the words we have in
common possess  an  unquestionable  meaningfulness,  so  that,  short  of  being
condemned to live verbally in an altogether meaningless world, we grant each
other the right to retreat into our own worlds of meaning and demand only that
each of us remain consistent within his own private terminology?28
Without  a  common  world  to  validate  the  meaning  of  words,  any  attempt  to  discuss  the
environmental crisis stands to lose, not agreement over fact or logic, but a basic sense of what
these facts mean and what should be done about them. Yet insofar as this tendency is countered
by attempts to transform and share scientific discoveries for the general understanding of all
people—a necessary precondition of its political reality (namely that it appear)—there remains
28 BPF 95-96.
13
the  potential  for  nature  to  enter  the  sphere  of  our  political  concern  and  to  be  shaped  by
discussions  and  actions  towards  the  world  we  wish  to  inhabit.  It  is  in  this  context  that
phenomenology emerges as a distinct project,  meant to retrace those common meanings and
square them against alternative forms of understanding. 
There is an element of reconstruction in deliberately phenomenological thinking. As I
will show in chapter 2, specific historical events have led to the situation outlined above. But in
order to understand just what changed, it is necessary to understand what preceded it. As a result,
it belongs to anyone wishing to think today to carefully refill this empty space where once the
world existed.29 Only then can a level plane be reestablished on which to examine the changes
brought  about  in  the  modern  age.  Thus,  the  most  appropriate  way  to  approach  the
phenomenological form of analysis is to set aside any knowledge gained second-hand, whether
the findings of scientists or the opinions of parties, and to check it only against the experience of
the bodily senses. Determining the meaning of a concept is a project that must be undertaken
politically, since it concerns the common world, but it begins with individual efforts at thinking.
In this chapter, therefore, I articulate the phenomenology of nature that Arendt adopts in
her reconstruction of the Eurowestern vocabulary prior to world alienation. I examine how the
concept of nature is informed by the three forms of activity Arendt focuses on in her important
work,  The  Human Condition:  labour,  work,  and  action.  Further,  I  connect  these  ideas  with
Arendt’s writings on art to show how an emphasis on making nature appear creates the potential
for political  action on environmental issues. I  conclude,  however, by noting that,  though we
continue to articulate scientific discoveries in terms of stories, comparing and contrasting them
29 I am here summarizing the introduction to Between Past and Future according to the notion of phenomenology 
by which I intend to capture the mode of understanding Arendt employs there and elsewhere.
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with  our  own  experiences  and  those  of  our  relations,  our  contemporary  predicament
problematizes action on these issues, as I discuss in subsequent chapters. 
Arendtian Phenomenology
Even though she never uses the term herself, I am by no means the first to read in Arendt’s work
a  form  of  phenomenology.30 But  before  I  proceed,  I  must  outline  what  it  is  I  mean  by
phenomenology, so that I do not stray too far from Arendt’s chosen self-conception. For one
thing, there is the lineage argument, i.e., the fact that Arendt studied with and maintained an
ongoing  conversation  with  some  of  the  twentieth  century’s  most  notable  self-titled
phenomenologists such as Martin Heidegger and Edmund Husserl.31 Given Arendt’s commitment
to them as both thinkers and friends (publicizing their thought in the United States, discussing
their  ideas  in  her  own  works,  avowing  herself  an  inheritor  of  the  tradition  of  German
philosophy,32 maintaining a correspondence, and so on), it seems reasonable to investigate the
phenomenological influence in her thought as a product of her education. More fundamentally, I
refer to the primacy of appearance in Arendt’s thinking. The word phenomenon comes from the
Greek φαίνω, meaning “to appear.”33 Phenomenology traces the way concepts reify common
experiences of appearance. As I understand the tradition, phenomenology takes for granted the
reality  of appearance,  meaning the direct  experience of the bodily senses.  As Arendt  writes,
“appearance—something  that  is  being  seen  and  heard  by  others  as  well  as  by  ourselves—
constitutes  reality.”34 From  this  basic  experience  of  reality,  we  develop  concepts  to  make
understanding possible:  “thought  itself  arises  out  of  incidents  of  living experience  and must
30 E.g. Canovan 1998; Borren 2010; Donohoe 2017. 
31 An argument employed especially in the scholarship of the 1980s and1990s. See for example Hinchman and 
Hinchman 1984 and Taminiaux 1996.




remain bound to them as the only guideposts by which to take its bearings.”35 Whether or not
there is something “behind” appearances is irrelevant, for what can be captured in conceptual
language is only that which appears.
The reason for this is that concepts, for Arendt, belong to the world, not to thinking
subjects, which is to say that they are always held in common. The world, for Arendt, is simply
what “relates and separates” us and it is made of things, that is, reified appearances. 36 As I read
her, a concept can be a thing in the same way as a chair can, for it is objective and worldly,
meaning  that  it  exists  in  a  common world  and  can  be  viewed  and  used  by  anyone.37 Only
appearance can be corroborated by others and therefore be entered as things into the world.
Thingliness, the result of reification, can only be ascribed to what appears. While that which does
not  appear  may  have  substance  and  importance  to  someone  or  something,  it  can  never  be
confirmed  through  shared  experience  and  communication,  which  are  the  cornerstones  of
worldliness.38 As such, it cannot assume conceptual form. 
This connection between concept and appearance explains why it is so difficult to put
into words experiences which are by definition personal and subjective. Arendt uses the example
of  pain,  which  she  describes  as  “the  most  private  and  least  communicable  of  all”  and  “so
subjective  and  removed  from  the  world  of  things  and  men  (sic)  that  it  cannot  assume  an
appearance at all.”39 I think also of the experience of smelling, which is always described through




38 “There may be truths beyond speech, and they may be of great relevance to man in the singular, that is, to man 
in so far as he is not a political being, whatever else he may be. Men in the plural, that is, men in so far as they 
live and move and act in this world, can experience meaningfulness only because they can talk with and make 
sense to each other and to themselves” (HC 4).
39 HC 50-51. Arendt repeatedly uses the term “man” and “men” to designate human beings, though she was aware 
of debates over the issues around using the gendered pronoun as a default for the entire species. I shall quote her
as she wrote and henceforth not mention it, for the sake of legibility. In so doing, I do not endorse her decision.  
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cannot even be expressed outside the experiences of an individual life (“like something that once
happened to me...”). Or the famous “ineffability” of mystical experience, which tears one out of
the world and brings one into direct, non-sensory relation with something beyond appearance. 
Concepts,  for  phenomenologists,  describe  a  set  of  appearing  experiences  that  are
available to all people through the human senses, and especially the clearest and most public
senses of hearing and sight.40 But only Arendt insists on the collective nature of experiences as a
prerequisite  for  conceptual  formulation.  As  such,  concepts  are  always  already  political.
Experiences are reified as concepts when they are sufficiently corroborated, at which point they
are given a name and entered into the worldly apparatus of language. A concept thus escapes
individual ownership and becomes available to all  who share a language (and thus a certain
dimension of the world),  to be employed and discussed like all  worldly things.  If  a specific
person is considered the authority on the meaning of a concept, it is because that person has
given  it  expression  most  perfectly,  but  not  because  they  “invented”  it  or  have  claim  to  its
ownership. Thus, when Arendt turns to major authors to explain a specific concept, it  is not
because she considers them its creator or owner, but because they are the greatest spokespersons
for it and likely had a strong connection to the experience at its core (which in turn usually
results from their position at the emergence of the experience in human history).41 A concept,
from the phenomenologist’s perspective (by contrast with that of the intellectual copyright owner
or  the  professional  academic,  both  constantly  seeking  the  new  and  the  idiosyncratic),  is
40 Setting aside for the moment the range of exceptionalities and disabilities that may affect access to common 
experiences.
41 See for example Arendt’s take on Rousseau’s discovery of “intimacy” (HC 38-39, OR 88) or Augustine’s 
formulation of “will” (BPF 161, LMW passim.). That Arendt seldom explored authors outside the conventional 
canon is likely the source of some biases in her writing (cf. the note on the male pronoun above). She was 
indeed reticent to allow people to challenge their definitions. But, at least theoretically, her thought is built 
around a deliberate attempt to make space for new voices, and pragmatically her own fearless entry into 
discussions on these concepts shows that she had no qualms about women or people of diverse backgrounds 
becoming authorities on a concept. 
17
anonymously authored and communally shared, to be expressed rather than defined, and most of
all neither relative nor subjective but worldly and objective.
The  experience  of  appearances  provides  the  content  of  a  given  concept,  but  to  be
corroborated and reified, the experience has to demonstrate certain repeatable properties. Tracing
the experiential connections inherent in concepts reveals what I like to call “packages,” or what
Arendt at one point calls “constellations,”42 the set of associations and relations that obtain in a
concept and that, so long as the latter is not alienated from its experiential roots, tend to reappear
together. Thus, as we shall see, nature is itself a conceptual package, grouping related concepts
such as generality and cyclicality. Packages show that concepts do not refer to things—they are
the things—but to related sets of patterns and functions. Thus, what is “natural” is not a definite
and distinct set of objects, as compared to unnatural or artificial things, but rather anything that
happens to reflect the associations involved in the concept-package “nature.” This understanding
allows things to be more or less natural, as they reflect package properties to a greater or lesser
degree. There is no nature and there are no purely natural things, metaphysically speaking, only
things that exemplify the pattern of appearances that are contained in the concept of nature. The
natural is not a class of objects; it is a mode of existence, phenomenologically speaking.
Thus, if thinking in phenomenological packages works at the level of appearances, it
does not claim to represent the essence of a thing to the exclusion of a competing or antithetical
category or package. While the natural is defined in opposition to the worldly or the political, for
Arendt, this opposition does not mean that a single thing cannot embody all of those concepts.
Indeed, it is precisely in the same entity—the human—that she finds the clearest example and the
source of these concepts. A concept helps explain a thing insofar as it appears according to the
pattern of other like things, thus providing the experience of a single concept. But if that same
42 HC 6.
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thing also, at different times, in different places, or even in the same time and place, appears as
something else, according to other patterns and in ways similar to other things, then it can also be
explained by those other concepts. Thus, to define the human, one cannot simply say that it is
natural,  or  worldly,  or  political,  but  that  it  is  all  three,  and  other  things  besides,  in
contradistinction to other entities that have different multifaceted properties (though, for Arendt,
the human is the only political thing that exists).
The Human Condition
Arendt’s phenomenological account of nature, in this sense, is chiefly to be found in The Human
Condition, though it is presented intertwined with several other topics as well as historical and
exegetical analyses.  The Human Condition  is a “phenomenology of human activities,”43 or of
what Arendt calls the vita activa. Arendt’s concern is with the “kinds of active engagement” of
which humans are capable and she focuses on the three primary activities of labour, work, and
action.44 Labour concerns the immediate sustenance of the living organism; work means the craft
of useful or durable objects; action is the capacity to speak and perform deeds in a web of human
relationships. Arendt applies this categorization to see in what ways Western civilization has
historically valued, structured, or misunderstood itself by the ways it has promoted or reduced
the  importance  of  each  of  these  human  activities.45 It  should  be  noted  in  passing  that  this
framework does not cover the range of human life or capacities in Arendt’s view: the vita activa
as a whole is contrasted with the  vita contemplativa46 and is also only one way of classifying
human activity, not a set of universal metaphysical categories. In accordance with the view of
43 Canovan 1998, xiii.
44 HC 14.
45 HC 6.
46 As well as the mysterious “life of pleasure” to which Arendt alludes at HC 13 and 14 without much explanation.
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phenomenology I have proposed above, we must keep in mind that these activities are concepts,
not discrete sets of exercises, and that an empirical practice can embody more than one, or parts
of several, or none at all.
The concept of nature only appears as such in The Human Condition in relation to these
activities and the related topics with which Arendt  is  concerned (the public and the private,
technology, religion, etc.). I follow this approach, tracing the concept of nature as it appears in
relation to labour, work, and action, not only as a convenient way to structure this chapter, but
also because, as I shall demonstrate, what Arendt shows is that the concept of nature is intimately
related with the components of the  vita activa. I shall argue that the very concept of nature is
constituted in the process of self-understanding through which we devise categories and terms to
understand the activities of which we are capable. Nature, then, is not an environment, but a
plane  of  existence  that  we  discover  by  the  very  fact  that  we  both  exist  on  that  plane  and
distinguish ourselves from it by our simultaneous existence on other planes. We are both natural
and artificial, and the one through the other.
Labour; Experiencing Nature in the Body
The activity of labour provides the first perspective on the experience of nature. Arendt’s most
succinct definition of labour is the following: “Labor is the activity which corresponds to the
biological process of the human body, whose spontaneous growth, metabolism, and eventual
decay are bound to the vital necessities produced and fed into the life process by labor. The
human condition of labor is life itself.”47 Every human being by virtue of being bodily and alive
relies on the provision of consumable goods for the reproduction of their own life and that of the
species, and the means by which we obtain these goods is labour. Thus the human is, in part,
47 HC 7.
20
what Arendt calls an animal laborans, the animal that labours. (This does not mean that every
single individual does or must labour to live, since, as Arendt notes, “[labour’s] power is not
exhausted when its own reproduction has been secured, it can be used for the reproduction of
more than one life process.”48 This basic overproductivity, which Marx first theorized as labour
power, is what enables us to take care of those who are not able to labour themselves, but it is
also the basis for “violent oppression in a slave society or exploitation in [a] capitalist society.” 49
Nonetheless, even the most privileged person can appreciate that their bodily existence is always
predicated  on  some-body’s  labour  understood  as  the  counterpart  of  consumption.)  Nature
emerges as the domain relative to which humans understand their labour: “Nature seen through
the eyes of the animal laborans is the great provider of all ‘good things,’ which belong equally to
all  her  children,  who  ‘take  [them]  out  of  [her]  hands’ and  ‘mix  with’ them  in  labor  and
consumption.”50 Nature is the collective biological existence to which humans belong with all
other living beings, each obtaining their own life from one another. In labour, the human being is
entirely integrated with nature, without distinction of subject and object, bodily metabolizing
with other living things. 51
This reliance of the body on nature’s provisions and the endless toil of labour places the
realm of nature under the sign of necessity. “Necessity and life are so intimately related and
connected that life itself is threatened where necessity is altogether eliminated,” writes Arendt.52
Life is inseparable from the sphere of nature, for “all human activities which arise out of the
necessity  to  cope with [the  biological  process  in  man] are  bound to the  recurring  cycles  of
nature.”53 She  likewise  makes  liberal  use  of  Marx’s  statement  “labor  is  the  eternal  natural
48 HC 88.
49 HC 88.
50 HC 134-5. Arendt’s own quotations are from Locke. See also HC 100.




necessity to effect the metabolism between man and nature.”54 In ancient societies, the realm of
necessity was held to be private, concerned as it  is with the body and the family above all:
“Natural community in the household therefore was born of necessity.”55 The realm of nature,
and by extension all human places that are dedicated to the natural facets of human existence,
i.e.,  to bodily and species reproduction,  is found to be unfree,  forceful,  and dedicated to the
perpetuation of life on penalty of death. If this sounds grim, it is only because of the human
“repugnance to futility,” but in practice the yoke of labour in compensated by the “sheer bliss of
being alive which we share with all living creatures,” and especially “the fleeting, though intense
pleasure  of  laboring  itself  which  comes  about  if  the  effort  is  co-ordinated  and rhythmically
ordered,  and  which  essentially  is  the  same  as  the  pleasure  felt  in  other  rhythmic  body
movements.”56 Thus, necessity justifies itself by the goodness of life, and becomes enjoyable in
the experience of symmetry and rhythm through which it can be organized.
Nature, in this sense, is the endless reproduction of biological existence, while labour is
the mode in which humans participate in the “ever-recurrent cyclical movement of nature.”57 We
discover the repetitive quality of nature’s motion by analogy with our own bodies. Writes Arendt,
“cyclical, too, is the movement of the living organism, the human body not excluded, as long as
it can withstand the process that permeates its being and makes it alive.”58 This perpetual motion
is often described as “swinging” and nature is nothing more than the complete circle in which all
of life “swings.”59 For the Greeks, nature is immortal, since identified precisely as the life process
that flows through each of the elements it encompasses, it would be a contradiction in terms if
54 HC 99n34.
55 HC 30.
56 HC 121, quoting Adam Smith; HC 106; HC 140.
57 HC 96.
58 Ibid.
59 HC 1, 15, 96, 97, 106, 137, 146, 246; BPF 42.
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nature were to die.60 Moreover, the endlessness of natural cycles including the reproduction of
species  assures  that  on  the  general  level  nothing  truly  dies:  “All  living  creatures,  man  not
excepted, are contained in this realm of being-forever, and Aristotle explicitly assures us that
man,  insofar  as  he  is  a  natural  being  and  belongs  to  the  species  of  mankind,  possesses
immortality [...] ‘Being for living creatures is Life,’ and being-forever ( εὶ Z ε ναὶ) corresponds toἀεὶ εἶναι) corresponds to ἶναι) corresponds to
εὶγενές, procreation.”ἀεὶ εἶναι) corresponds to 61 The fact that something is not alive at a particular moment (rocks and
streams as much as carcasses and humus) is irrelevant to whether it is natural or not, for what
matters is its participation in the life process itself, in the endless circle of nature. Thus, “through
the recurrent cycle of life, nature assures the same kind of being-forever to things that are born
and die as to things that are and do not change.”62 Concerning what is natural about us, we are
just like every other member of our species—“our natural equipment [is what] we share with
everybody”63—and as long as the species exists so does our natural being.
Thus, the natural is also the general. The natural is what applies to every member of a
species, while something is natural to the extent that it is like every other thing of its kind. That is
why we speak of the “nature” of something as what is general to all instances of that category.64
Arendt argues that “animals exist only as members of their species and not as individuals” and
that “the  animal laborans is indeed only one, at best the highest, of the animal species which
populate the earth.”65 This perspective does not mean that individual animals do not exist, only
that their existence as animals is identical with their membership in the species. Consequently,




64 For the same reason, we cannot speak of “human nature” because what is rightly called human is precisely what
transcends nature; it is a who rather than a what  (HC 9-11; see also 84, 193). This idea, for which Arendt draws 
on Augustine, is taken to the furthest limit by the ninth century philosopher Eriugena who argues that being 
created “in the image of God” refers to the fact that the human cannot know its own nature, just as God is 
beyond being circumscribed by a nature. We are like God because, like God, we cannot know what we are. The 
same idea is suggested in the docta ignorantia of Nicholas of Cusa. Cf. Chapter 2.II below. 
65 BPF 42; HC 84.
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insofar  as  human beings  are  animal  laborans,  they  are  identical  to  one  another  and merely
animals.66 Our fundamental bodily reliance on nature makes us all one and the same. “This one-
ness,” writes Arendt on the topic of labour power, “indicates the unity of the species with regard
to which every single member is the same and exchangeable.”67 Humanity as a species, as animal
laborans, is only one of the many products of nature and, considered as such, individuality is of
no consequence.
In the same way that applying a natural lens entails viewing things in their generality, it
views them as a process, only existing so long as they “swing.” There is no distinction, from this
perspective, between the various stages in life: “the natural thing’s existence is not separate but is
somehow identical with the process through which it comes into being: the seed contains and, in
a certain sense, already is the tree, and the tree stops being if the process of growth through
which it came into existence stops.”68 This process is automatic, so to speak, in that it goes on
without  direction  or  intention.  It  does  not  rely  on  a  conscious  being  to  control  it:  “It  is
characteristic of all natural processes that they come into being without the help of man, and
those  things  are  natural  which  are  not  ‘made’ but  grow  by  themselves  into  whatever  they
become.”69 Indeed, for the Greeks, not even divinity is directly responsible for their growth as
they “come into being by themselves without assistance from men or gods—the Olympian gods
did not claim to have created the world.”70 Arendt finds this quality in the etymology of the term,
as she writes, “this is also the authentic meaning of our word ‘nature,’ whether we derive it from
its latin (sic) root nasci, to be born, or trace it back to its Greek origin, physis, which comes from




70 BPF 42. See also LMT 143.
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phyein, to grow out of, to appear by itself.”71 For Arendt, then, nature in its phenomenological
meaning is self-moving and uncreated.
Being in perpetual motion and process, having “no beginning and no end,” nature does
not lead anywhere or have a goal; it is inherently futile, “purposeless and turning within itself,”
as suggested by the quality of necessity noted above.72 In itself, life does not produce anything
other than its own reproduction, whether on the organism or species level. This does not mean
that natural things do not need to bother, but only that their efforts will not lead to anything
beyond what already exists, as in the example of the tree that would stop living if it ceased to
grow. In the case of humans, writes Arendt, “it is indeed the mark of all laboring that it leaves
nothing behind, that the result of its effort is almost as quickly consumed as the effort is spent.
And yet  this  effort,  despite  its  futility,  is  born of  a  great  urgency and motivated by a more
powerful  drive  than  anything else,  because life  itself  depends upon it.”73 Moreover,  nature’s
movement is meaningless as it does not tell a story. It is “without rhyme or reason” as McCarthy
writes.74 In nature, “there is no  tale of the manifold kinds or of the names they bear, nor truly
were the tale worth reckoning out; whoso will know it, let him [...] learn likewise how many
grains of sand eddy in the west wind on the plain of Libya, or count [...] how many waves come
shoreward across Ionian seas.”75 The infinite grains of sand and the waves endlessly hitting the
shore exemplify how in this domain there is no beginning or end, no differentiation which could
71 HC 150. Nasci is a present active infinitive. McCarthy chooses the intransitive nascere for a similar etymology 
in “One Touch of Nature,” which was changed to the perfect active participle natus in the posthumous reprint 
edition (1970, 191). The future active participle naturus makes the connection most clearly.
72 HC 98; BPF 42.
73 HC 87.
74 1970, 209. Cf. 191, where she writes that “genetics [...] have a ‘plot,’ mutation, a ‘storyline.’” Here, however, 
she is already speaking from the perspective of modern science, which departs from the immediate experience 
of nature as cyclical.
75 Virgil, quoted at LMW 213. Emphasis is Arendt’s.
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bring meaning to its activity. Its “circling years produce no tales worth telling” for “it never
‘produces’ anything but life.”76
Work; Crafting Nature into a World
In Arendt’s view, the capacities of animal laborans are augmented by the capacity of the human
being to exceed the natural condition of life in the work of homo faber, “man the maker.”77 In the
experience of work, we appreciate our difference from the rest of nature and set against its norms
those of an enduring world. As Arendt describes it, “work is the activity which corresponds to the
unnaturalness  of  human  existence,  which  is  not  imbedded  in,  and  whose  mortality  is  not
compensated by, the species’ ever-recurring life cycle.  Work provides an ‘artificial’ world of
things,  distinctly  different  from all  natural  surroundings.”78 As  homo faber,  humans  reverse
nearly all  natural qualities:  their  production is teleological,  or rectilinear,  and ends when the
product is finished; the production process is controlled by a rational mind and based on an ideal
model; workers work with their hands rather than metabolizing with their bodies; they work with
dead things and their production is inorganic; their products are useful but not necessary; this
product is durable and, while it outlasts individual lives, it tends toward decay or gets used up,
without  self-reproducing,  and therefore is  not  immortal.79 The environment  created by  homo
faber is a world, distinct from nature by its durability and specificity; indeed, we can “erect a
man-made world only after destroying part of God-created nature.”80 The world created through
fabrication is the environment in which specifically human life occurs. 
76 LMW 214; HC 88.
77 HC 304.
78 HC 7.
79 HC 143; HC 141; HC 136; HC 169; HC 154; HC 136-37. See also BPF 44: “The works of human hands owe 
part of their existence to the material nature provides and therefore carry within themselves some measure of 
permanence, borrowed, as it were, from the being-forever of nature.”
80 HC 139.
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From this “unnatural” perspective, we turn to nature and see it differently. Nature does
not change, it goes on moving in its cycle, but we notice our ability to interrupt its processes. In
these interruptions, we discover material, and nature itself comes to appear as a repository of
resources. As Arendt writes, “this material itself is not simply given and there, like the fruits of
field and trees which we may gather or leave alone without changing the household of nature.
Material is already a product of human hands which have removed it from its natural location,
either killing a life process, as in the case of the tree which must be destroyed in order to provide
wood, or interrupting one of nature’s slower processes, as in the case of iron, stone, or marble
torn out of the womb of the earth.”81 In short, the human experience of work, “whenever men
pursue their purposes, tilling the effortless earth, forcing the free-flowing wind into their sails,
crossing the ever-rolling waves,”82 introduces a new dimension to nature: mortality. In work, the
human imports its own mortality into its dealings with nature. Whatever  homo faber touches
becomes mortal, cut off from the life process and introduced into a fabrication process. Material
is nature viewed through the lens of mortality.
It is for this reason, Arendt points out, that work contains a fundamental element of
violence. As workers, human beings “do violence to nature because they disturb what, in the
absence  of  mortals,  would  be  the  eternal  quiet  of  being-forever  that  rests  or  swings  within
itself.”83 Indeed, “this element of violation and violence is present in all fabrication, and homo
faber, the creator of the human artifice, has always been a destroyer of nature.”84 Like work,
violence “is ruled by the means-end category” and based on the use of “implements,” in contrast
81 HC 139. Compare Heidegger’s notion of “standing reserve,” which he takes to be a modern development. 
Arendt, in a way like Ursula Franklin, sees this as one of two or more views existing in the pre-modern world, 





to the futile and bodily character of nature.85 Weapons create unnatural advantages between one
organism and another.  Without  tools  and weapons,  organisms must  rely  for  survival  on  the
natural advantages built into their bodies and shared among members of the same species: teeth
and  claws,  camouflage  and  shells,  venom and  webs.  In  Arendt’s  view,  one  living  organism
attacking and consuming  another  does  not  constitute  violence;  as  an  ordinary  reality  in  the
natural realm, it belongs to the general category of necessity.86 Once killed, the prey is instantly
incorporated into the life  process of  the predator,  whereas  the worker maintains its  material
outside the realm of nature, fixed in the durable world. Nature is “forceful” but not violent, for its
compulsion is that of movement and necessity, not of strength augmented by tools.87 
If  the  worker’s  intervention  in  nature  takes  the  form  of  violence,  nature’s  cyclical
motion manifests itself as growth and decay from the perspective of the world. While fabrication
tries to freeze in death the material it has obtained from nature, the latter reappears to reintegrate
worldly objects into the life process by “overgrowing or decaying it.”88 In this respect, however,
the activities of labour and work can support one another. Homo faber enlists animal laborans,
whose “human body is engaged to keep the world clean and prevent its decay.”89 In cleaning and
repairing, the “monotonous performance of daily repeated chores,” we return to the endless cycle
of nature, only this time in reverse: it is the “protection and preservation of the world  against
natural processes,” as though to resist nature’s cycle one had to create a miniature cycle within it
85 OV 4.
86 At HC 129, Arendt finds the same relation of pain to nature and necessity in torture, quoting Wallon: “On 
croyait recueillir la voix même de la nature dans les cris de la douleur.” [It was believed the voice of nature itself
was heard in cries of pain.] Completing the circle, Arendt earlier notes that the etymological root of the French 
word for labour, travail, lies in tripalium, “a kind of torture” (HC 80). Incidentally, this is the same root as the 
English travel.
87 OV 44-45; HC 140. Cf. OR 83: “goodness, because it is part of ‘nature’, does not act meekly but asserts itself 
forcefully and, indeed, violently.” This, however, occurs in Arendt’s reading of Melville’s Billy Budd as a 
response to the revolutions and their associated “state of nature” doctrines. The intent of the story is to rebut a 
political theory and its subject matter is morality. The judgment of violence derives from the law, and is 




which turned in the opposite direction.90 Meanwhile, as  homo faber, we come to assist in the
labouring process by inventing tools to make the toil easier and the burden lighter. As Arendt
writes, “from the standpoint of labor, tools strengthen and multiply human strength to the point
of almost replacing it, as in all cases where natural forces, such as tame animals or water power
or electricity, and not mere material things, are brought under a human master.” 91 Nonetheless,
neither  the  labour  that  protects  the world from nature nor  the  worker’s  tools  that  assist  the
labourer change the essential facts about their respective domains: tools belong most properly to
the domain of fabrication and while they may help the labourers, they cannot completely replace
them (labour  continues  to  be required,  if  only to  maintain the tools);  at  the  same time,  the
satisfaction of consumption that normally accompanies labour is lost when it serves the world’s
needs, such that chores become a “fight” requiring “endurance.”92
With that said, there is perhaps more middle ground than readily appears. Arendt often
speaks of things being more or less natural, more or less worldly, and more one insofar as it is
less the other.93 I noted above that animals do not lead individual lives and exist only as members
of species. However, Arendt seems to allow that they too can be wrenched from the general life
process and enter the worldly sphere, as indicated in the reference to “tame animals” as “natural
forces [...] brought under a human master.”94 In this way, animals can inhabit a zone in between
natural life and worldly use. Let us take this reflection further. She earlier writes that “only if we
consider nature’s products, this tree or this dog, as individual things, thereby already removing
90 HC 100, emphasis added.
91 HC 122.
92 HC 122; HC 100, 101. Cf. the account in Xenophon, Oeconomicus, Bk. VIII, of the delight that comes from 
organizing and maintaining a household. This, however, may relate rather to the concept of beauty, which is 
discovered in the arrangement of things, rather than satisfaction in the chores itself: “And what a beautiful sight 
is afforded by boots of all sorts and conditions ranged in rows! How beautiful it is to see cloaks of all sorts and 
conditions kept separate, or blankets, or brazen vessels, or table furniture! Yes, no serious man will smile when I
claim that there is beauty in the order even of pots and pans set out in neat array, however much it may move the
laughter of a wit. There is nothing, in short, that does not gain in beauty when set out in order.”
93 E.g. HC 96, 172.
94 HC 122.
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them from their ‘natural’ surroundings and putting them into our world, do they begin to grow
and to decay.”95 Thus, merely by conceiving them in their individuality, we implicate animals in
our world and, consequently, in mortality. This, indeed, would be the price to pay for conferring
on animals the privilege of human beings, which is to have an “individual life, a  βίος, with a
recognizable life-story from birth to death, ris[ing] out of biological life, ζωή.”96 By welcoming
animals  into  the  human  realm,  they  too  come  to  possess  individuality,  originality,  and,  as
McCarthy suggests, “personality.”97
And what of the tree mentioned alongside the dog? Turning to human-plant relations,
we discover that some of Arendt’s most curious writings deal with agriculture. In  The Human
Condition, Arendt asks whether it is true that agriculture is a case of “labor transforming itself
into work.”98 She concludes  in the negative for  the reason that  the “product” of agriculture,
cultivated  land  (not  to  be  confused  with  the  “goods”  that  are  reaped  there,  which  are
unequivocally the fruit of labour), does not possess its own durability and will not last as an
object for any longer than it continues to be tended; “the tilled soil, if it is to remain cultivated,
needs to be labored upon time and again.”99 It is not “a true reification.”100 However, a lingering
doubt remains, which Arendt seems to want to rush past, concerning the suggestion that, so long
as land is being laboured, it does remain cultivated. But is that not a basic property of worldly
things, as noted above? Does not furniture get worn down and require reupholstering and oiling
to persist in being? Indeed, even great works of art, which Arendt considers the most worldly









cultivated  land  is  not  the  end-goal  of  a  fabrication  process,  and  is  in  fact  produced  only
incidentally  by  labouring  for  other  things,  it  does  tend toward  the  worldly—it  has  worldly
potential—much like humans or the animals they domesticate.
This idea is taken further in “The Crisis in Culture.” Here Arendt contrasts Roman and
Greek approaches  to  agriculture.  The latter  “tended to consider  even agriculture as  part  and
parcel of fabrication,” thus in direct opposition to Arendt’s view in The Human Condition.102 The
Greeks associated agriculture with work because they emphasized the violent element in it, its
reliance on “‘technical’ devices,” by which one “tore from the womb of the earth the fruits which
the gods had hidden from men.”103 The Romans, on the other hand, held agriculture “in very high
regard  [...]  in  opposition  to  the  poetic  and  fabricating  arts.”104 They  conceived  it  rather  as
“cultivating and tending nature until it becomes fit for human habitation.”105 In other words, this
Roman  conception  of  agriculture,  which  Arendt  finds  useful  for  her  theory  of  culture  (see
below),  occupies  an  intermediary  space  between  labour  and  work,  nature  and  world.   By
preparing the land for habitation, agriculture anticipates the world, opens a space within nature
for the world to surface,  and yet it  is  neither one nor the other—it is  “tended nature.” 106 As
McCarthy notes, perhaps not coincidentally taking Italy as her example, “the works of man—
agriculture—are so woven into the primal fabric as to be a second nature. This is plain even to
the most insensitive tourist in an ‘old’ country like Tuscany where windbreaks and olives and
grapevines seem inseparable from the geological pattern of peaks and valleys making up the
original scenery.”107 And while Arendt disparages the possibility that this approach is capable of
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viewing nature, neither as subsistence-seekers, nor as prospectors, but, in “an attitude of loving
care,” as stewards of the life of the Earth.108
McCarthy also suggests a further possibility for crossover between nature and world. In
this  case,  it  is  not  nature  that  takes  on  features  of  the  world,  but  what  might  normally  be
considered products of work take on a natural cast. She suggests that some buildings and objects,
those we might call “vernacular,” are actually “natural” rather than artificial.109 There are several
points  on which  these  objects  fail  to  meet  the  criteria  for  work set  up by Arendt:  they  are
representative of “species,” meaning human societies,  rather  than individuals;  they are made
from local materials with which they integrate rather than separate; they are not made according
to a plan or model; and, I might add, they typically develop gradually, according to need, rather
than resulting from a closed fabrication process. In Arendt’s terms, these buildings could only be
fully natural if they were also short-lived and consumable. Nonetheless, Arendt does provide for
a grey zone between the world that outlasts individual lives and direct metabolism with nature in
her understanding of a “home on earth,” referring to pseudo-natural buildings like the temporary
dwellings of nomadic peoples.110 McCarthy’s Tuscan buildings may likewise be “homes on earth”
for their inhabitants, which Arendt would likely also consider pre-worldly.
Action; Deliberating and Deciding Our Approach to Nature
Action, the third activity Arendt includes in her account of the  vita activa, appears to ignore
nature altogether and set itself in opposition to its ideals completely. Arendt defines action as
“the only activity that goes on directly between men without the intermediary of things or matter,
[and which] corresponds to the human condition of plurality, to the fact that men, not Man, live
108 BPF 212. It is equally unlikely that it will lead to political greatness, according Arendt; see LMW 213.
109 1970, 204. For a succinct and nuanced definition of vernacular architecture, see Oliver 2006.
110 BPF 210.
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on the earth and inhabit the world. While all aspects of the human condition are somehow related
to politics, this plurality is specifically the condition—not only the conditio sine qua non, but the
conditio  per quam—of all  political  life.”111 Action is  made up of “words and deeds,”  which
disclose the actor’s unique self but are “about some worldly objective reality.”112 In this sense,
action  occurs  only  if  and  when  these  acts  take  place  among  a  group  of  peers  who  act  as
witnesses.  Indeed,  what  makes  action  is  only that  revelation  of  unique  individuality,  which,
without observers, would not exist, and yet which can trigger chains of events through the whole
of the web of human relationships.113 Action, for Arendt, is the proper origin of politics, and
politics is whatever concerns and surrounds this capacity for action. If politics has come to mean
government or diplomacy or other related concepts, it is because these have their origins in the
plurality of human beings on earth and initially formed around the issues of living in common.
For Arendt, politics denotes precisely those realms of human existence, whether concerned with
government or not,  in which the plurality of human beings and the disclosure of the self  to
perceiving others, is at play.
While  work  opposes  labour  in  many  ways,  action  typically  inverts  it  much  more
dramatically. While everyone depends on labour by virtue of the necessity of maintaining life,
workers are interchangeable so long as they possess the same understanding of the models that
direct work and the skills to bring them into being.114 By contrast, a person’s actions are utterly
their own, tied to the absolute uniqueness of who they are, such that the same deed performed by
two persons has a different meaning in each case. Action corresponds to the specificity of an
individual, whereas labour corresponds to people in their generality and commonality and work
111 HC 7.
112 HC 182, emphasis in original.
113 HC 178.
114 HC 140-41. 
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to their knowledge and abilities within a given practice.115 On the other hand, while our natural
bodies and learned abilities provide each of us with unequal properties and capacities, politics is
predicated on the artificial preservation of civil equality before the law and the community.116
Furthermore, labour and work are essentially speechless, making use of language for the purpose
of  organization or  communication  only,  as  if  to  make several  individuals  act  as  one  and in
concert.117 Action,  on the other hand, is present wherever speech is used to reveal oneself  to
another, and conversely all politics is predicated on the possibility of speaking to one another in a
shared language.118 Finally, while labour is futile in the sense of producing nothing but itself,
action likewise has no tangible product; and yet, it is in action that we impart meaning on our
lives and derive the stories that result from setting off processes throughout the web of human
relationships.119
 Arendt does not consider action to have an inherent relationship with nature, unlike
work which transfigures nature into material and carves out a place for the world within the
natural environment. Life is a prerequisite for political action, since one must be alive in order to
act, but neither its condition as it is for labour nor its material as it is for work. Though human
plurality is predicated on our “life on earth,” the sine qua non mentioned above, it completely
transcends this mere life when in action it is illuminated “without the intermediary of things or
matter.”120 Action concerns itself with the world, as an important piece of politics is working out
as a community what shape we wish our world to take, or in other words, making choices about
what models of fabrication will be employed to produce the world we will inhabit and on the







basis of what principles we make those decisions.121 Work is  undertaken within the rubric of
utility and ends-means efficiency. But, as Arendt points out, this is never enough to completely
determine the choices  we will  make in  creating the world.  For,  she pointedly asks,  quoting
Lessing,  “what is the use of use?” In other words, if something is useful, it  must useful  for
something, but this something cannot be determined by usefulness alone.122 Only when a space is
created for people to come together and decide together how usefulness is to be applied and to
what principles our world is to be aligned is a properly political process at work for shaping the
world. This is the place for action. Under all other circumstances where decisions proceed as if
the usefulness of certain options were taken for granted, there are hidden assumptions about
which values are prioritized and whose voices are heard. And without a forum to discuss these
assumptions and make opposing cases, politics is undermined, and either mere life or some other
principle (e.g. religion) monopolizes the capacity to make change.123
However, until recently (with the advent of technologies that unleash cosmic processes
into nature), it was not possible for action to make such decisions directly on the shape of nature.
If human beings were not also fabricators, tending nature for the sake of erecting on and out of it
a stable world, or political,  concerned with the form that world takes, their natural existence
would  in  no  way  have  political  qualities;  other  natural  things  are  not  political  and  their
naturalness is insufficient to make them so. Conversely, action does not inherently turn to nature
and add new dimensions to it as fabrication does. Action’s meaning lies in itself; it deals with the
public realm, which by definition does not concern the “private” domain of the body or the
household; its principle is freedom rather than necessity; and its effect is nothing but the story
that unfolds to the community of witnesses. In short, action is as indifferent to nature as nature is
121 BPF 223-24. 
122 HC 154.
123 See chapter 3.
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to it,  and overlap between labour and action is inconceivable.124 While nature is the cycle in
which the labourer participates and a collection of resources to the fabricator, it is nothing at all
to the political person, whose “environment” is properly only the other people among whom
action takes place125 and whose “content” and “product” are both words and deeds.
The most telling example Arendt gives for this incompatibility is that of the French
Revolution,  in which political  actors attempted to resolve “the social  question,” meaning the
public provision of private goods.126 Politics took up the burden imposed on us by the condition
of necessity and, that door opened, found itself swept up in the “force of nature” that was the
peasants’ rage.127 Authentic  action,  or  freedom,  as  Arendt  defined it,  was  undermined in  the
spontaneously organized political  councils  while the capricious “general will” held sway and
demanded unwavering conformity: “the result  was that the power of the old regime became
impotent and the new republic was stillborn; freedom had to be surrendered to necessity, to the
urgency of the life process itself.”128 A consequence of this irreconcilability is that politics, in
Arendt’s understanding, requires a certain degree of what we today would call privilege. So long
as our basic needs are untended, we cannot be expected to leave aside our own personal or class
interests. Our actions are motivated by the same animal need that everyone else possesses, rather
than by revelation of our perfectly unique selves. Our decisions about how to structure the world
will revolve around how best to provide the fruits of labour to ourselves or to all, reducing the
world to a servant of life’s necessity, rather than focus on the principles we would like to see
shaping the world for its own sake, enjoyed in perfect freedom.129 The exclusivity of politics from
124 Perhaps in this connection Arendt would reference the story of Cincinnatus who must abandon his farm to 
become dictator of Rome, and retire his laurels to return to the plow.
125 The frequently misunderstood “space of appearance” (see for example HC 199ff.).
126 OR 54.
127 OR 105-106. 
128 OR 54.
129 For a discussion of how this is built into contemporary society so as to limit political resistance, see chapter 3. 
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this perspective is a penalty we must accept if we are to apply this mode of understanding, at
least  until  such a  time as  all  people  are  permitted  and supported  to  obtain  their  own basic
necessities. It is the responsibility of those with privilege to see to it that they make use of it for
the betterment of the world.
If nature is incompatible with action insofar as to be preoccupied with the provision of
natural goods devolves the political sphere into one of mere “administration of things,”130 it does
not follow that we cannot enact our natural existence, or the encounters between our worldly and
natural existences, in the stories we tell as political beings. This function comes to the fore in
Arendt’s  discussion of  the political  virtue of  judgment,  as  related  to  the  concept  of  culture.
Judgment, for Arendt, is the faculty by which human beings are able to step outside themselves
and view things from another person’s perspective, so as to arrive at a reasonable conclusion
taking into account multiple points of view.131 This faculty is intimately related to the importance
of  appearance.  Judgment  can  only  be  undertaken  when  considering  the  multiplicity  of
perspectives on things that appear, for it is inherent in judging that it deals with things that are
accessible to all.132 That which I cannot see and hear myself, at least potentially, I cannot properly
judge. It is therefore necessary to make nature appear in order to make it the object of political
judgment. 
The same importance of perception is the lesson that Arendt wishes to draw from her
survey of classical approaches to agriculture, discussed above. Her argument is that our concept
of  culture  incorporates  both  Roman  and  Greek  aspects  and  that  these  are  related  to  their
agricultural practices. From Rome, we inherit the notions of “developing nature into a dwelling
130 BPF 19, quoting Engels.
131 BPF 221. 
132 Thus, it is noteworthy that McCarthy appeals to the senses to justify her contention of the naturalness of certain 
kinds of buildings—“take it visually,” she says (1970, 204).
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place for a people as well as [...] taking care of the monuments of the past,”133 and from Greece
we add “that  curious  and ill-defined  capacity  we commonly  call  taste.”134 Culture  comes  to
encompass the care-taking of nature in anticipation of the building of a world, the preservation of
those things that make up the world, and most importantly for Arendt, the political capacity to
deliberate about and judge the objects of the world and thus to make collective decisions about
“how this world [...] is to look and sound.”135 Judgment, or taste, comes to play a key role in the
political process of developing culture by which we decide on the form of our world. But in
retracing these steps, I am also suggesting that the role of political judgment has its roots already
at the cultural stage where we prepare the world in our intercourse with nature, as discussed
earlier, and that as such the way we treat the natural realm is a question of political consequence.
Concern for the common world is the principal way in which politics impacts nature. Though
political action cannot decide how nature looks or control its movement, nonetheless by making
decisions about worldly matters, political actions will have an impact on the natural environment
on which the world relies. If there is a necessary stage of preparing nature for the world in the
construction of  the latter,  then it  is  reasonable  when introducing opinions  on how the  latter
should look to take into consideration the stage of preparation and its effects on both nature and
world.
Likewise, coming together politically, i.e, as equals in a space of appearance, to marvel
at and discuss nature, we are already on the path to making decisions about how to make our
world in the midst of it. For it is through the sharing and judging of experiences of nature that we
truly give meaning to the natural realm. In so doing, we constantly invite nature into the space of





considering the tree and the dog in their individuality. The most elementary form this storytelling
of nature takes might be mythology. Arendt’s own phenomenological conceptualization, which I
have tried to  outline here,  derives from the Eurowestern tradition,  where nature possesses  a
primarily temperate and seasonal form. But there are also different experiences of the natural,
such as those of the Indigenous peoples of Turtle Island or African and Asian perspectives, and
from places where the natural is experienced as more or less extreme, wetter or drier, tropical,
arctic, or equatorial. What is perhaps of most importance for political action is to develop a view
of nature appropriate to where one lives and acts. In the stories we tell about nature, we invite a
plurality  of  voices  to  share  their  experience  and  to  contribute  to  a  common,  though  ever-
changing, conception of the natural world. The artist or storyteller crafts these experiences into
worldly artifacts at the disposal of the community of actors, who are invited to judge and reflect
on them. For it is among the functions of art to make things appear.136
Caveat
We cannot help but make an impact on the course of natural cycles. But we can choose what
approach we will  take in both our labouring and our working. We can choose, for example,
whether to emphasize the violent aspect of wrenching materials from the Earth or we can opt for
an  attitude  of  loving  care,  mitigating  the  damage  we  wreak  and  attenuating  the  necessary
violence of work. At a time when we have the technological capacity to make especially large
impacts, this reflective consideration is of the utmost importance. Judgment is Arendt’s solution
for consciously considering multiple points of view, while action is the means by which we can
make these decisions  collectively.  Only by carving out  a  space for  people to  judge and act
136 Returning to my previous examples, then, we may consider Bacon’s rendering of the experience of pain or 
Bernini’s depiction of mystical rapture as efforts to make the private appear in public. 
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together will this be possible, and only insofar as we recognize the appropriate scope of human
interference in nature. We can only act for the world, with the understanding that it is maintained
and supported by nature’s bounty, while we must remain attentive to the intrusion of questions of
necessity or private and social interest in these deliberations.
This view of nature feels in some ways familiar, and in others completely backwards or
in conflict with our sensibilities. As will become clear, this is because these connotations survive
alongside alternative forms of understanding that challenge and redefine the concept of nature.
Indeed, even the definition of what a concept is changes according to the mode of discourse one
employs. In this chapter, I have briefly shown what I take a concept to be from the perspective of
phenomenology  and  I  have  analyzed  how  Arendt  defines  the  concept  of  nature  in  a
phenomenological mode. In the next section, I shall focus on those discourses that have gained
dominance  in  the  modern  age  alongside  and  in  connection  with  what  Arendt  calls  world
alienation. These forms of understanding, especially modern science, while shedding light on
dimensions of reality previously unimaginable, at the same time require that we surrender our
attachment  to  the  world  and  approach  experience  from a  removed  perspective.  It  is  in  the
vacillations between longing for worldliness and connection, on one hand, and the undeniable
findings of science, which undermine some of the basic presuppositions of common worldliness,
on the other hand, that we currently live. It is therefore our challenge to find ways to reconcile
them, for it cannot be possible to live fully, and to appreciate fully, our lives as human beings,
nor to approach the environmental crisis, without them both.
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CHAPTER 2
I: Laws of Nature
In this chapter, I examine Hannah Arendt’s analysis of world alienation as a growing problem of
the modern age and its role in the construction of a new concept of nature. The “modern age”
refers to the period that “began in the seventeenth century [and] came to an end at the beginning
of the twentieth century [...]  with the first  atomic explosions,”137 and it  is  in this period that
Arendt  locates  the  seeds  of  many  contemporary  issues.  As  she  writes,  “the  purpose  of  the
historical  analysis  [in  The  Human Condition]  is  to  trace  back  modern  world  alienation,  its
twofold flight from the earth into the universe and from the world into the self, to its origins, in
order to arrive at an understanding of the nature of society as it had developed and presented
itself at the very moment when it was overcome by the advent of a new and yet unknown age.” 138
Understanding  how  world  alienation  emerged  in  the  modern  age  climaxing  in  the  rise  of
totalitarianism and the atom bomb, in other words, provides a key to understanding the crisis of
nature in the contemporary moment. 
In her historical analyses, Arendt leaves behind her phenomenological approach and
opts for an unusual historiography involving political theory, art criticism, and philosophy that is
distinctly Arendtian. I include under this rubric not only the historical segments that bookend
The Human Condition but also and especially the seminal work The Origins of Totalitarianism to
137 HC 6. 
138 HC 6. In the latter sections of The Human Condition, Arendt distinguishes between world alienation and earth 
alienation (264). However,  earlier on and in “The Concept of History,” the two are combined under one 
umbrella, which is how I shall proceed (BPF 89). For one, I do not believe the distinction is as pivotal to her 
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next to no scholarly attention. Moreover, while world is strictly speaking distinguished from both Earth and 
nature, the present study aims to show their interdependence, such that world alienation necessarily 
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which  the  former  were  initially  intended  as  a  follow-up.139 There,  Arendt  deploys  an
extraordinary amount of historical scholarship, together with readings of representative works of
literature  and philosophy,  to  make sense  of  unprecedented  historical  phenomena and adds a
meta-theoretical analysis of how experience and events shape and are determined by emerging
systems  of  understanding.  In  my  reading,  I  alter  the  order  of  composition  of  these  works,
showing how, in  The Human Condition,  Arendt was seeking to supplement her earlier  book
through the notion of world alienation, which prepares the way for antisemitism, imperialism,
and totalitarianism. Responding to accusations of obscurantism in  Origins,  Arendt supplied a
phenomenological framework, together with a historical account of alienation, which together
illuminate the information contained in the earlier work.  In this chapter, I focus on how the
concept of nature is transformed by historical changes and, conversely, how its resulting form is
deployed in totalitarianism. 
In these writings, Arendt details the emergence of a new concept of nature, inscribed
within the gradual rise of previously marginal forms of understanding, notably empirical science.
The concept of nature that arose in the context of alienation is marked by several key differences
from the  phenomenological  concept  developed in  the  last  chapter.  Below I  give  a  complete
picture  of  how  I  understand  this  concept.  The  principal  difference,  however,  lies  in  the
understanding that nature is something beyond the reach of appearances. For Arendt, the turning
point in our relationship to the natural environment, which in turn would shake the human sense
of worldliness to the core, was the discovery that our senses could mislead us, indeed could not
be trusted, and that reality was sneaking around  behind appearances. As she sums up the new
position: “whatever human senses perceive is brought about by invisible, secret forces, and if
through certain devices, ingenious instruments, these forces are caught in the act rather than
139 Young-Bruehl 1982, 278.
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discovered—as  an  animal  is  trapped  or  a  thief  is  caught  much  against  their  own  will  and
intentions—it  turns  out  that  this  tremendously  effective  Being  is  of  such  a  nature  that  its
disclosures  must  be  illusions  and  that  conclusions  drawn  from  its  appearances  must  be
delusions.”140 Nature, along with all other modes of being, retreated behind a veil beyond which
we could never properly access, only speculate about. These speculations frequently took the
form of a search for the “laws of nature.” 
Thus, in the present chapter, I will attempt to trace how this new concept of nature,
defined by its remoteness from direct human experience, emerged in the modern era. Doing so, I
try to keep in mind that for Arendt, as she repeated frequently, “not ideas, but events change the
world.”141 Thus, I shall follow Arendt in her discussion of the three major events that produced
world alienation as a general phenomenon, with particular attention to the way in which human
views of nature played a role in these events and were in turn shaped by them into what I have
described above. Subsequently, I assess the connection of the concept of nature to the ideology
and structure of totalitarianism. But first, it is imperative to understand what Arendt means by
world  alienation,  for  as  Arendt  writes,  “the  event  illuminates  its  own past;  it  can  never  be
deduced from it.”142 Only if we can appreciate the situation of world alienation that has emerged
in contemporary times are we prepared to isolate and make sense of the history that produced it,
as well as the environmental crisis it has, in turn, produced. 
World Alienation
Arendt provides numerous images to explain her view of what has happened to us in the modern
age. She is fond of quoting Tocqueville’s comment that “since the past has ceased to throw its
140 HC 276-277. 
141 E.g. HC 275. 
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light upon the future the mind of man wanders in obscurity.”143 The image here is of a solitary
individual trying to make sense of things, but finding no precedent to appeal to and no guiding
thread to hold onto, she stumbles blindly in the dark. It is reminiscent of another image Arendt
conjured later in her life: “thinking without a banister.”144 In a sense, the solitary individual is the
most important part of this image, since the figure illustrates the fact that the guideposts we seek
would normally be shared by many; in other words, our isolation in our attempts to understand is
the problem. But of course the fact that the models of the past no longer match new realities is
equally problematic, testifying not only to how important stability and precedence are for our
understanding,  but also for  our ability  to  communicate  with one another,  to  find each other
through the obscurity. The endless novelty of contemporary events protracts an inability to find
grounding for understanding and for communicating. World alienation is this radical isolation in
which we “either live in desperate lonely separation or are pressed together into a mass. For a
mass-society is nothing more than that kind of organized living which automatically establishes
itself among human beings who are still  related to one another but have lost the world once
common to all  of them.”145 When we resort  to  familiar  concepts like nature,  we are seeking
banisters that may no longer be applicable to contemporary experiences. We are using a language
that developed in another world entirely, straining to make its terminologies fit heterogeneous
situations.  How these  concepts  have  served  as  organizing  bonds  in  a  mass  society  will  be
explored below.
Another image that recurs in Arendt’s work is that of the world as table. As she writes,
“to live together in the world means essentially that a world of things is between those who have
it in common, as a table is located between those who sit around it; the world, like every in-
143 For example, at BPF 7, 77; OR 50, 114. 
144 Young-Bruehl 1982, 453.
145 BPF 90. 
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between, relates and separates men at the same time.”146 Understanding the world as a table in
this  way helps  to  portray  the  situation  of  world  alienation:  “the  weirdness  of  this  situation
resembles  a  spiritualistic  seance  where  a  number  of  people  gathered  around  a  table  might
suddenly, through some magic trick, see the table vanish from their midst, so that two persons
sitting opposite each other were no longer separated but also would be entirely unrelated to each
other by anything tangible.”147 World alienation refers to a situation such as this one, in which
there is neither any intermediary world “relating and separating” people, nor any stability in the
organization of humans as a society, nor any meaningful framework to which humans can look to
escape the “melancholy haphazardness” of human history, as Arendt notes in reference to Kant.148
The table is important because it is distinct from the people who sit around it, yet accessible to
them all; it creates a direct, though mediated connection. In a situation of alienation, a void lies
between each person and the outside world. Individuals are “atomized,” neither able to connect
to others nor to distinguish themselves among them. 
146 HC 52. 
147 HC 53. I recently came across a passage from Chesterton, which seems written as if intentionally to offer a 
parable of world alienation, similar to this one. I include it here as a helpful supplement, of which I believe 
Arendt would have approved: 
Suppose that a great commotion arises in the street about something, let us say a lamp-
post, which many influential persons desire to pull down. A grey-clad monk, who is the spirit of
the Middle Ages,  is approached upon the matter,  and begins to say, in the arid manner of the
Schoolmen, “Let us first of all consider, my brethren, the value of Light. If Light be in itself good
—” At this point he is somewhat excusably knocked down. All the people make a rush for the
lamp-post, the lamp-post is down in ten minutes, and they go about congratulating each other on
their un-mediaeval practicality. But as things go on they do not work out so easily. 
Some people have pulled the lamp-post down because they wanted the electric light; some
because they wanted old iron; some because they wanted darkness, because their deeds were evil.
Some thought it not enough of a lamp-post, some too much; some acted because they wanted to
smash municipal machinery; some because they wanted to smash something. And there is war in
the night, no man knowing whom he strikes. So, gradually and inevitably, to-day, to-morrow, or
the next day, there comes back the conviction that the monk was right after all, and that all depends
on what is the philosophy of Light. Only what we might have discussed under the gas-lamp, we
now must discuss in the dark” (original in Heretics, quoted in Leys 2011, 524n1).
148 E.g. BPF 82; LMW 154.
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“World alienation, and not self-alienation as Marx thought, has been the hallmark of the
modern age,” Arendt writes.149 How did this happen? In  The Human Condition, Arendt isolates
three distinct events at the dawn of the modern age that have each in their own way contributed
to  the  emergence  of  world  alienation  as  a  ubiquitous  condition.  These  three  events  are  the
discovery of the Americas by Columbus, the Reformation, and the invention of the telescope.150
Through  the  histories  they  initiated,  these  events  also  have  important  ramifications  on  the
concept of nature. World alienation transforms our ways of relating to the Earth. Alienation takes
the human perspective to a viewpoint outside the cycle of the life process and the limitations of
earthly existence, which Arendt, playing on an aphorism by Kafka, describes as “the discovery of
the Archimedean point.”151 Like Archimedes who looks for a point outside the earth from which
to  move  it,  the  modern  perspective  places  itself  outside  the  immediate  relation  to  nature,
simultaneously questioning its basic properties and turning it into a metaphysical category to be
uncovered and defined. In each of these events, humans placed themselves, either physically or
mentally,  at  a  remove  from their  embedded  relation  to  the  natural  environment.  Without  a
common world, the potential for a consensus on the meaning of nature is equally lost, so that
nature follows the world to the other side of an abyss separating us from what lies “behind” the
senses.  Thus,  nature becomes something radically  other,  on the far  side of an inside/outside
binary.  In the following,  I  shall  examine each event  in  turn,  outlining the specific ways the
concept of nature comes to be transformed through them, and relating them to larger themes in
the analysis of world alienation and the origins of totalitarianism. This will then provide the basis
(though not the full story) of the modern alienated concept of nature, whose role in society and
politics will subsequently be explored. 
149 HC 254. 
150 HC 248. 
151 HC 248. 
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The Columbian Venture; Mapping Lands and Peoples
The discovery of the Americas sparked a globe-spanning project of exploration and mapping—as
well as colonization—by Europeans that, in Arendt’s time, had “only now begun to come to an
end.”152 The  consequence  of  these  endeavours  was  “the  famous  shrinkage of  the  globe”  for
“nothing can remain immense if it can be measured, [...] every survey brings together distant
parts and therefore establishes closeness where distance ruled before.”153 Earth became no longer
the  all-embracing,  discontinuous,  and  life-providing  ground  on  which  humans  live,  but  a
territory, “small and close at hand,” across which humans can travel at will and whose image is
the “globe [in] our living rooms.”154 This horizontal shrinking, however, was achievable only
through a vertical separation implied in the map and the globe, as it could only be conceived
from a place outside of, and far from, the sphere of the earth: “any decrease of terrestrial distance
can be won only at the price of putting a decisive distance between man and earth, of alienating
man from his immediate earthly surroundings.” In other words, it required an escape, at least in
thought, from the situated position wherein humans are themselves natural, so as to view nature
not as a condition of existence but as a category of landscape.155 
The distance that these adventurous Europeans placed between themselves and the earth
in order to map and measure it was exacerbated by their experience in natural landscapes wholly
unlike  their  own.  These  were  extended  sojourns  in  places  where  the  traditional  European
categories of understanding were not prepared to accommodate other  realities. The experience
152 HC 250. Arendt, who was writing during a tide of independence movements, would have to reconsider her 
timeline in light of more recent developments and additional information. 
153 HC 250. 
154 HC 250; 251. 
155 The idea of the “human” that emerges from this development is intricately connected to the role of colonizer. 
The related question as to when Arendt is using the term in this way or in her phenomenological mode is a 
difficult one to grapple with. Her discussion, or critique, of this period of European history is very intimate, 
showing a failure to make clear whose perspective she is exploring at any given point. Cf. Wynter 2003. 
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of  such  alien  forms  of  nature,  and  of  the  people  who  inhabited  them and  with  whom the
sojourners  could  not  seem to communicate,  reinforced the  idea  of  nature  as  radically  other.
Arendt expresses the feelings of Europeans in Africa when she states that they encountered “a
horrifying experience of something alien beyond imagination or comprehension” in the form of
human beings who acted dramatically different from themselves.156 To these outsiders, the native
peoples were “human beings who apparently were as much a part of nature as wild animals.”157
They could not accept that these were people in the same right as themselves, for they seemed so
dramatically  different—the  Eurowestern  picture  of  human  nature  in  its  generality  was
insufficiently large to embrace such a contrast. To retain their own self-worth, they had to look
for a new explanation for this fundamental challenge to their belief in human difference from
nature:  “the  ‘white  men’ could  not  but  reconsider  their  own humanity  and decide  that  they
themselves were more than human and obviously chosen by God to be the gods of black men.” 158
Whereas, from a phenomenological perspective, everyone has to an equal degree the need to
labour  and  preserve  their  life  process,  constituting  their  natural  selves,  the  new  explorer’s
perspective saw different kinds of humans (rather than different kinds of human activity), some
of whom were wholly natural and others who were utterly not. By extension, “natural” people
are unable to speak, for speech is political and nature is speechless,159 and any protest made in a
language other than that of the occupiers could only be heard as an animal cry. 
In sum, the universality of concepts phenomenologically derived from experiences in
one particular place was challenged by experiences in other places.  Rather than amend their
understanding  of  nature  and  worldliness,  the  explorers  applied  their  mapping  techniques,
156 OT 195. 
157 OT 194.
158 OT 195. 
159 See chapter 1. 
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predicated on distance and alienation, to Indigenous peoples. There is a persistent blindness at
work in this categorization, whose motivations we cannot discuss here.160 And it is not without
some discomfort that we find Arendt reproducing this failure and misrepresentation, through her
own  proximity  to  European  methods  and  vocabulary,  though  this  is  in  fact  a  useful
exemplification of the very incongruity between a crumbling phenomenological worldview and
emerging systems of power and understanding. It seems that the simple degree of difference in
forms and patterns in the ways of living of different groups of people was too great to allow for
the  transposition  of  phenomenological  concepts  derived  from  one  group  to  the  other.  The
distance  placed  between  experiences  of  difference  and  established  forms  of  understanding
suggested a kind of alienation, to which the explorers were apparently accustomed and prepared
to employ. Thus, they opted to elevate themselves to the rank of gods in the same way they
elevated themselves above the globe, compounding the alienation from non-human nature with a
division within humanity itself between “natural” or “savage” humans and cultured ones. 
This self-aggrandisement, Arendt argues, only served to engross the supposed cultured
group in the pursuit of “natural” superiority and “natural” laws. As she writes, “when the Boers,
in their fright and misery, decided to use [Indigenous people] as though they were just another
form  of  animal  life,  they  embarked  upon  a  process  which  could  only  end  with  their  own
degeneration into a white race living beside and together with black races from whom in the end
they would differ only in the color of their skin.”161 Becoming so caught up in mastery of nature,
160 The one-sidedness of this approach was occasionally recognized by contemporaries, such as Victor Segalen, 
about whom Simon Leys writes, “in contradistinction to the writer-tourist, Segalen sets out to depict less the 
effect of the surroundings on the traveller than the effect of the traveller on the surroundings” (2011, 91). 
Segalen noticed that his fellow adventurers “have told what they saw, what they felt in the presence of 
unexpected things and people the shock of whose encounter they had sought out. But have they revealed what 
these things and people thought themselves, or what they thought of them, the visitors? For there is perhaps also
a shock delivered by the traveller to the spectacle before him, a reverse shock that affects what the traveller 
sees” (quoted, ibid.). Despite these astute observations, Leys argues, Segalen still fell short of his own 
ambitions. 
161  (OT 194). See also OT 197; 465ff. 
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the occupying Boer colony ended up completely subsumed by natural processes. Having first
externalized  the  concept  of  nature,  mastery  over  it  required  a  complete  submission  to  its
supposed “laws.” The Boers’ racist society in Africa, Arendt argues, is like “a laboratory test” for
the full-fledged racist state of Nazi Germany, to which I shall turn below.162 
Exploration created not only a physical distance between the explorers and nature, but
produced a concept of nature as foreign and hostile. As a whole, nature appeared to be hiding
secrets, such as other continents. At the same time, in the different forms of life, human and non-
human  alike,  exploration  revealed  a  number  of  differences  irreconcilable  within  established
categories  of  understanding.  This  challenge  to  the  understanding  was  met  with  facile  and
arrogant notions of superiority and progress, which would later blend with scientific ideas of
evolution to produce racist doctrines. Nature as historical and external was discovered in the
bodies  of  foreign  peoples  and  species,  demarcating  some  as  more  or  less  evolutionarily
developed,  but  ultimately enveloping them all  in  a  total  natural  process  without  place  for  a
common world. 
The Reformation; Capitalism as Natural Growth
162 OT 196. Though perhaps not directly related to the project of world exploration, another process of 
“naturalization” occurred around this time. Arendt calls it a transition “from crime to vice” (OT 79ff). Whereas 
certain categories of people, namely Jews and homosexuals, had had their actions criminalized in pre-modern 
society, this was mainly to enforce a particular civil order. But in the nineteenth-century salons, “personalities” 
from these groups were exoticized and allowed to enter société in order to titillate the desire of their hosts to “be
bad.” The corollary of this was that homosexuality and Jewishness were no longer the qualities of people who 
lost some rights based on what they believed or did, but examples of intriguing, alien types. Homosexuality and 
Judaism was naturalized, they became what one was. Consequently, when such “vices” as being gay or being a 
Jew fell out of fashion or became the subject of political controversy (as in the Dreyfus Affair), these people 
were not merely punished for what they did or believed (which assumes that one can of course not do or believe 
such things), but persecuted for what they were. Belonging to a category that fell outside the accepted norms of 
a society now permanently banished one from that society, making one unprotected from the hatred of one’s 
fellows, subject to violence or exile. 
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For Arendt, the salient of factor of the Reformation, the second major event at the start of the
modern age, is not the religious schism it caused, but the expropriation of land it sparked.163 In
the vein of Max Weber, she ties the Protestant movement with an economic system in which land
is changed from a private part of the common world into a capital asset.164 The new view of land
is mirrored in the new view of workers whose “labour power”—the capacity to produce a surplus
of  goods  beyond  the  basic  requirements  of  the  labouring  organism itself—is  now released.
“Expropriation,” she writes, “the deprivation for certain groups of their place in the world and
their naked exposure to the exigencies of life, created both the original accumulation of wealth
and the possibility of transforming this wealth into capital through labor.”165 It was the birth of
capitalism.
For  Arendt,  capitalism  is  an  economic  system modelled  on  the  natural  world.  The
expropriation triggered by the Reformation led to a growing bourgeois class, unlike any class
that had existed so long as the public realm was protected from private interests and land was not
used as capital. Early witnesses of these events such as Adam Smith understood that they had to
do with the release of labour’s capacity to produce surplus, and therefore turned to the natural
realm to explain the phenomenon:
Historically,  political  theorists  from  the  seventeenth  century  onward  were
confronted  with  a  hitherto  unheard-of  process  of  growing  wealth,  growing
property, growing acquisition. In the attempt to account for this steady growth,
their attention was naturally drawn to the phenomenon of a progressing process
itself, so that [...] the concept of process became the very key term of the new
age as well as the sciences, historical and natural, developed by it. From its
beginning, this process, because of its apparent endlessness, was understood as
a natural process and more specifically in the image of the life process itself.
The crudest superstition of the modern age—that “money begets money”—as
well  as its  sharpest  political  insight—that  power generates power—owes its
plausibility to the  underlying metaphor of the natural fertility of life.  Of all
163 HC 252. 
164 HC 254-256; 68ff. 
165 HC 254-255. 
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human  activities,  only  labor,  and  neither  action  nor  work,  is  unending,
progressing automatically in accordance with life itself and outside the range of
wilful decisions or humanly meaningful purposes.166
Notably, this metaphor leaves out the swinging cyclicality of nature, emphasizing only fertility
and growth and ignoring the death and decay that typically accompany it. Both labourers and
land are valued only for the excess they are capable of producing, but this excess, which is called
wealth, is not reintegrated into the swinging cycle of nature as it would “naturally” be: it  is
accumulated and redeployed as capital  for continued growth. As Arendt writes,  “without the
process  of  accumulation,  wealth  would  at  once  fall  back  into  the  opposite  process  of
disintegration through use and consumption.”167 This is what she calls the “unnatural growth, so
to  speak,  of  the  natural”  by  which  “the  growth  element  inherent  in  all  organic  life  [has]
completely overcome and overgrown the processes of decay by which organic life is checked
and balanced in nature’s household.”168 
The metaphors of nature applied to an economic system carry unexpected consequences
if, as I have argued, concepts tend to move in packages. Thus, with the advent of a new capitalist
regime and its use of the notion of overproductivity, or fertility, a new form of corporeality is
created. Organic growth is measured relative to the confines of a defined body; likewise, the
capitalists must establish clear boundaries within which the growth process can be measured.
The definitive example of such an abstract body is the nation-state. “The bourgeoisie,” writes
Arendt, “had developed within, and together with, the nation-state, which almost by definition
ruled  over  and  beyond  a  class-divided  society.”169 The  nation-state  purports  to  represent  a
166 HC 105-106, emphasis added.
167 HC 69. 
168 HC 47.
169 OT 123. For Arendt, the class-based society is a phenomenon of the modern age, which even by her own time 
was no longer applicable. She quarrelled with Marxists at length on this point. Its connection to “the rise of the 
social” as a realm neither private nor public is certainly relevant here, but a full analysis is beyond the scope of 
this paper. It is the hidden link between the previous section on the classification of peoples with this one on 
capitalist economics. It would be worthwhile pursuing this topic at greater length, though the scope of this paper
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coherent body made up of a homogeneous human population inhabiting a definite territory to
which the people have a historical relationship: “Nations entered the scene of history and were
emancipated when peoples had acquired a consciousness of themselves as cultural and historical
entities, and of their territory as a permanent home, where history had left its visible traces,
whose cultivation was the product of the common labor of their  ancestors and whose future
would depend upon the course of a common civilization.”170 For Arendt, France is the nation-
state  par  excellence,  capable  of  demonstrating  a  distinct  cultural  and  ethnic  identity  tied
explicitly  to  a  particular  geographic  area.171 It  is  from the  perspective  of  such  a  politically
organized economic body that the commonwealth is calculated and accumulation measured. 
Arendt’s  description  of  the  economic  workings  of  the  nation-state  can  be  clarified
through her analogous study of the household in pre-modern ages.  Humans hold property in
order to carve out a piece of nature to serve as the basis for their labouring, thereby maintaining
their individual life processes (and those of anyone who depended on them).172 Property in this
sense is marked by a dual character, as natural from the inside and as worldly from the outside:
“one’s location in a particular part of the world.”173 The growth and procreation of individual
bodies  should  therefore  be limited  by the  amount  of  sustenance  provided by their  allocated
property,  whether  it  be agricultural  land,  forest  for foraging and hunting,  etc.  Conversely,  it
would be in the interest of a property-owner or steward to ensure they do not deplete the land
such that it become unable to sustain life.  Economy would dictate that larger gains could be
reaped over time by not reaping everything at once. Arendt argues that, in the modern age, the
state becomes increasingly concerned with occupations formerly limited to the household, while
prevents me from doing so. 
170 OT 229.
171 OT 50. According to Arendt, all other countries that have attempted to organize themselves on the nation-state 
model have done so to a greater or lesser degree of failure, sometimes to catastrophic results.
172 HC 30. 
173 HC 61.
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society is conceived as one large “super-human family.”174 The term “economy” (etymologically
rooted in “home management,” as is often noted) is extended to the boundaries of the state;
“political economy” is conceived at this time, which would otherwise have been a “contradiction
in terms.”175 The public realm becomes concerned with private interests, the deceptive notion of
the “commonwealth,” which in reality is not common at all, since it is primarily owned by the
bourgeois class that profits from the labouring class.176
Like the head of a household making the most of their resources to grow private wealth,
the bourgeois buys and trades goods and establishes production facilities on a national scale to
grow the supposed wealth of the whole. Nonetheless, though the nation-state constitutes a body
from the perspective of economic calculation, it hides many distinct factions within itself. As a
landowner manages a homestead—its land, livestock, facilities, slaves—the bourgeois class deals
with the labouring population and the natural resources of the nation merely as assets intended to
produce a surplus. Thus, just as the private property of land has a twofold appearance, being
worldly from the outside and natural-economic from the inside,  so too does the nation-state
present a unified front to other nations while internally it subsists from class distinctions. 
But where the scope of the body and the measure of value become abstract, referring to
the set of assets available to a capital-wielding class, the scale of potential labour surplus appears
indefinite.  Unlike the household,  which is  intended to produce only so much wealth as will
liberate its head from the need to labour in order to engage in higher callings such as politics and
philosophy, the national wealth seeks to continue growing indefinitely, even at the cost of the
political sphere altogether. The wielders of power within the capitalist system are alienated from
the source of their wealth, namely labourers and natural processes, concerned instead with the
174 HC 29.
175 HC 29.
176 HC 68-69. See below on erosion of political life by economic interests. 
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pseudo-natural  process  of  wealth  accumulation.  They  are  therefore  careless  with  regard  to
maintaining  its  sustainability.  Thus,  Arendt’s  claim  above  that  the  idea  that  “money  begets
money” is  a crude superstition.177 What in fact  begets  money are the processes that produce
commodifiable goods, but the capacity of these processes to reproduce themselves is destroyed
when value, as money, is alienated from its sources. 
This  was  proven  in  the  late  nineteenth  century,  when  the  capacity  to  produce  and
accumulate  wealth  was  reaching  a  crisis  point  in  industrial  European  nations  due  to  the
incapacity of the land to produce more wealth, while the accumulated wealth had nothing left to
invest in (and therefore grow). Thus, the capitalist classes of the nations could only find one way
to maintain the momentum of accumulation and resist the process of disintegration: expansion.
This  was  the  imperialist  period,  which  Arendt  defines  as  “the  three  decades  from 1884  to
1914.”178 As Arendt writes:
Innocently enough,  expansion appeared first  as the outlet  for  excess capital
production and offered a remedy, capital export. The tremendously increased
wealth  produced  by  capitalist  production  under  a  social  system  based  on
maldistribution  had  resulted  in  “oversaving”—that  is,  the  accumulation  of
capital which was condemned to idleness within the existing national capacity
for production and consumption. This money was actually superfluous, needed
by nobody though owned by a growing class of somebodies. The ensuing crises
and  depressions  during  the  decades  preceding  the  era  of  imperialism  had
impressed upon the capitalists the thought that their whole economic system of
production depended upon a supply and demand that from now on must come
from “outside of capitalist society.” Such supply and demand came from inside
the nation, so long as the capitalist system did not control all its classes together
with its entire productive capacity. When capitalism had pervaded the entire
economic structure and all social strata had come into the orbit of its production
and  consumption  system,  capitalists  clearly  had  to  decide  either  to  see  the
whole  system  collapse  or  to  find  new  markets,  that  is,  to  penetrate  new
177 There are traces in Arendt (e.g. OT 135) of the more modern assessment of financial speculation as the ultimate 
aim of capitalism, whose inherent wish is to be rid of natural processes altogether and to deal with money solely




countries which were not yet subject to capitalism and therefore could provide
a new noncapitalistic supply and demand.179
For  Arendt,  the  real  loser  in  the  imperialist  venture  was not  so much the  occupied
peoples, but the sphere of politics in general. Though political and bourgeois forces had been in
tension for some time within their own countries, the imperialist project resolved conclusively
for  the  latter.  As  Arendt  writes,  “imperialism  was  born  when  the  ruling  class  in  capitalist
production  came up against  national  limitations  to  its  economic  expansion.  The  bourgeoisie
turned to politics out of economic necessity; for if it did not want to give up the capitalist system
whose  inherent  law is  constant  economic  growth,  it  had  to  impose  this  law upon its  home
governments and to proclaim expansion to be an ultimate political goal of foreign policy.” 180 The
bourgeois classes commanded for themselves the means of violence in order to tear into their
colonies, challenging at every turn the politicians who had naively assumed their  occupation
forces were being used for the betterment of foreign peoples. As their power accumulated, that of
the politicians diminished, such that eventually a “boomerang effect” was produced, whereby the
bourgeois successively took over their own governments. 
In the end, the turmoil sparked by the expropriation of land, the first jab at worldliness
predicated on having a stable, private place in a common world, came full circle when the natural
process replaced government through the organization of society on a capitalist model. The final
stage  in  this  process  is  what  we  today  call  globalization,  “the  economic  and  geographic
shrinkage of the earth, so that prosperity and depression tend to become world-wide phenomena.
[...] Just as the family and its property were replaced by class membership and national territory,
so mankind now begins to replace nationally bound societies, and the earth replaces the limited
179 OT 147-148. 
180 OT 126.
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state territory.”181 But this world-wide economic process is not to be confused with a rediscovery
of the world. “Whatever the future may bring,” writes Arendt, “the process of world alienation
started by expropriation and characterized by an ever-increasing progress in wealth, can only
assume even more radical proportions if it is permitted to follow its own inherent law.”182 And,
“the process of wealth accumulation, as we know it, stimulated by the life process and in turn
stimulating  human  life,  is  possible  only  if  the  world  and  the  very  worldliness  of  man  are
sacrificed.”183 
Galileo’s Discovery; Modern Science and Radical Doubt
The third event is without question for Arendt the most decisive for the modern age’s world
alienation, and its influence on the concept of nature is no less fundamental. And yet, though it
occurred early in the seventeenth century, its effects were not fully perceived except by a small
circle of experts until centuries later.184 The invention of the telescope and the discoveries made
by Galileo by means of it are for Arendt an event unprecedented by the earlier speculations of a
heliocentric universe, for the latter were mere hypotheses, useful for speculation but ultimately
unverifiable.185 Galileo provided concrete evidence at a specific historical moment: “Ideas, [...] as
distinguished from events, are never unprecedented, and empirically unconfirmed speculations
about the earth’s movement around the sun were no more unprecedented than contemporary
theories about atoms would be if they had no basis in experiments and no consequences in the
factual world. What Galileo did and what nobody had done before was to use the telescope in
such a way that the secrets of the universe were delivered to human cognition ‘with the certainty
181 HC 257. 
182 HC 257. 
183 HC 256. 
184 HC 258, 268.
185 HC 259. 
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of sense-perception’.”186 The telescope was the first instrument “at once adjusted to human senses
and destined to uncover what definitely and forever must lie beyond them,” and thus this event
marked a decisive “challenge to the adequacy of the senses to reveal reality.”187 Through his
studies, Galileo demonstrated that the evidence of the unmediated human senses was equivocal
and could be disproved by technological findings. By reaching outside the usual limits of the
human senses, by means of technology, one found that things are not always as they appeared at
the  human  scale.188 A more  accurate  truth,  one  infers,  is  always  lying  behind  appearances,
whether  it  is  the  movement  of  the  stars,  disease-causing  germs,  or  personality-constructing
neurons. 
The capacity to imagine oneself out of embedded existence and to view the Earth from
the outside is what Arendt calls the Archimedean point, which defines the approach of modern
science. Regarding scientific modes of representation, she writes “these are no longer ideal forms
disclosed to the eye of the mind, but are the results of removing the eyes of the mind, no less
than the eyes of the body, from the phenomena, of reducing all appearances through the force
inherent  in  distance.”189 The  full  development  of  the  potential  of  this  force,  namely  that,  as
Archimedes had predicted, finding a point outside the Earth would grant the ability to manoeuvre
186 HC 259-60. 
187 HC 258, 261. 
188 To illustrate how dramatic this change is, I find it useful to consider a passage in St. Augustine’s De Magistro 
(1995, 3.11.26). Augustine reflects on how a straight stick appears to bend when dipped in water, a distortion 
today called refraction. He notes that, though we know the stick itself has not bent, both the straightness of the 
stick and the appearance of bending are real. The illusion of a bent stick is the product of the transformation of 
light rays as they pass through water, but that does not make it less real, as we can understanding by means of 
“common sense, the sixth and the highest sense,” the kind of reasoning that takes into account the various, 
sometimes contradictory data of the senses and makes sense of them by incorporating them into reality as it is 
commonly known to be and disregarding momentary illusions (HC 274). This reasoning is always available to 
the immediate human perspective when it is in touch with common sense, and therefore with a common world. 
By contrast, Galileo’s discoveries suggested that our very place in the universe, our positionality and scale, hide 
certain realities from us, implying that we have to leave behind our situated point of view altogether to discover 
what is “real.” Thus, “the old opposition of sensual and rational truth, of the inferior truth capacity of the senses 
ad the superior truth capacity of reason, paled beside this challenge, beside the obvious implication that neither 
truth nor reality is given, that neither of them appears as it is” (ibid.).
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58
it  at  will,  would  not  come into  its  own until  the  twentieth  century. 190 This  development,  in
Arendt’s view, is far more significant than all the events defining world alienation dealt with here
and will therefore be covered in the next chapter. Within this timeframe, the most important
effects  of  Galileo’s  institution  of  modern  science  were  the  changes  it  wrought  in  ways  of
knowing. 
The first to appreciate the full significance of this event for human understanding was
Descartes, “the father of modern philosophy.”191 With his radical doubt, Descartes formalized the
experience  that  was  revealed  in  Galileo’s  discovery,  namely  that  “intelligibility  to  human
understanding does not at all constitute a demonstration of truth, just as visibility did not at all
constitute  a  proof  of  reality.  This  doubt  doubts  that  such a  thing  as  truth  exists  at  all,  and
discovers thereby that the traditional concept of truth [...] had rested on the twofold assumption
that what truly is  will  appear of its own accord and that human capabilities are adequate to
receive it.”192 Whereas the history of Western philosophy had heretofore consisted in a series of
inversions of the order of such phenomenologically derived categories as Labour and Work or
Faith and Reason, the modern tradition had to deal with the possible meaningless of them all, for
now “Being and Appearance part company forever.”193 Thinkers of the nineteenth century like
Kierkegaard, Marx, and Nietszche attempted to comprehend these changes by operating “a much
more  radical  turning-about  [of  ideas]  than the mere  upside-down operations”  of  pre-modern
philosophy.194 Nonetheless, in Arendt’s words, they could do no more than “record the darkening
of the clear sky where those ideas, as well as other presences, had once become visible to the
eyes of men.”195 In the end, philosophers found themselves seeking truth anywhere from radical
190 HC 271. 
191 HC 271-72. 
192 HC 275-76. 
193 HC 275. 
194 BPF 38. 
195 BPF 40. 
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faith to radical relativism, and finally to abandoning stability altogether for solipsism or belief in
a process of perpetual change, whether conceived under the umbrella of history or nature.
The most important part of these changes for the concept of nature concern the loss of
common sense deriving from Cartesian doubt and the accompanying turn to mathematical and
experimental  methods  of  discovering  truth.  When  all  content  is  suspect,  the  only  basis  for
continued learning is the acceptance that “even if there is no truth, man can be truthful, and even
if there is no reliable certainty, man can be reliable.”196 What unites people in their understanding
is merely the form or structure of a particular line of reasoning, for the reality of a common
world given to all through appearance and by the senses is lost. Appearance can no longer be
trusted and therefore there is no need to corroborate one’s understanding either by checking with
other people for similar experiences or with one’s own sensory experiences. Thus, “common
sense,  which once had been the one by which all  other senses,  with their  intimately private
sensations, were fitted into a common world, just as vision fitted man into a visible world, now
became an inner faculty without any world relationship. This sense was now called common
merely because it happened to be common to all” in form, not because it was genuinely shared
by  all  through  a  relationship  to  a  common  world.197 The  highest  form  a  purely  structural
consistency of thought takes is that of mathematics, and therefore all scientific knowledge in the
modern age seeks above all to express itself in mathematical language. “The modern  reductio
scientiae ad mathematicam has overruled the testimony of nature as witnessed at close range by
human senses” such that behind any given set of appearances, some higher law or pattern is
always present, waiting only to be discovered and formalized.198 From this perspective, the best
guarantor of the “truthfulness” of a theory of natural laws is its consistency; a theory does not
196 HC 279. 
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necessarily have to be corroborated by appearance, since these are known to be deceptive. At the
limit, working within the strict confines of logical reasoning, any given starting point could be
chosen from which to derive a theory of nature, and to “prove” it one need merely bring about
the expected consequences by means of technology.199 
Consequently,  as  Arendt  writes,  “Cartesian  reason is  entirely  based  ‘on  the  implicit
assumption that the mind can only know that which it has itself produced and retains in some
sense within itself.’”200 Since it was a specific technology, the telescope, and not any creative
reasoning or contemplation that first made clear the inadequacy of human-scale knowledge, it
was concluded that “only interference with appearance, doing away with appearances, can hold
out a hope for true knowledge.”201 Modern science likewise proceeds on the assumption that it
must  constantly  test  its  hypotheses,  verify  them  against  new  experiments,  and  devise  new
technologies to “produce” the “phenomena and objects it wishes to observe.”202 The consequence
is  that  “instead of  objective qualities,  [...]  we find instruments,  and instead of nature or the
universe—in  the  words  of  Heisenberg—man encounters  only  himself.”203 On  one  level,  this
means that the interests that motivate research will always appear in its results. In other words,
because  we  no  longer  trust  the  accuracy  of  our  senses  or  our  ability  to  create  our  own
interpretations  of  appearances  with  reference  to  a  common  world,  we  must  always  devise
technologies to reveal the truth, yet the very fact that these devices are made for a given purpose
and by human hands means that they cannot reveal anything other than what we are seeking. On
a deeper level, the very structure of reasoning, of the human mind engaged in mathematical and
199 This conclusion is, in Arendt’s estimation, a key feature of ideological thinking and the driving force of 
totalitarianism (OT 457-58). See below. 
200 HC 283. Arendt’s quotation, which she uses as a motto for the scientific enterprise, is from Whitehead. 
201 HC 274. 
202 HC 284. The credo of modern science is helpfully given by a character in Robinson’s Red Mars (unsurprisingly 
a scientist devoted to the relentless pursuit of knowledge): “There is this about the human mind; if it can be 
done, it will be done. [...] We can do it, so we will do it” (1993, 213). 
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logical  deduction,  are  the  only  possible  findings  of  science:  “scientists  formulate  their
hypotheses  to  arrange  their  experiments  and  then  use  these  experiments  to  verify  their
hypotheses;  during  this  whole  enterprise,  they  obviously  deal  with  a  hypothetical  nature.”204
Consequently, the “real” nature perpetually retreats beyond the capacity of understanding. 
As  Arendt  sees  it,  “all  the  processes  of  the  earth  and  the  universe  have  revealed
themselves  either  as  man-made  or  as  potentially  man-made.  These  processes,  after  having
devoured, as it were, the solid objectivity of the given, ended by rendering meaningless the one
over-all process which originally was conceived in order to give meaning to them, and to act, so
to speak, as the eternal time-space into which they could all flow and thus be rid of their mutual
conflicts  and  exclusiveness.”205 The  technologies  invented  throughout  this  pursuit  are  most
definitely capable of extending our reach, but at a significant cost. “The rise of natural sciences,”
writes  Arendt,  was  accompanied  by  “a  demonstrable,  ever-quickening  increase  in  human
knowledge and power” as well as “the hardly less demonstrable increase in human despair.”206
Scientific knowledge relies on technology, which as it  becomes more refined and specific to
certain experiments, retreats further from the everyday experience available to all. It is therefore
unrepresentable by the words which are derived from common experience, and interpretation of
scientific  experiments  must  resort  to  highly  technical  language.  Its  findings,  in  sum,  are
meaningless to most, such that even when they are expressed in everyday language, they distort
its common-sense meaning and become highly liable to misinterpretation or manipulation. This
results in differing meanings for each new listener, even while the ordinary meanings are reduced
to  one  of  several  competing  and  arbitrary  interpretations.  Nature,  constantly  evading  the
comprehensive and conclusive understanding of scientists—who forget that it is always already a
204 HC 287. 
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construction of their perception—yet removed from the sphere of common sense, becomes the
container for any consistent theory of universal laws to which increasingly despairing humans
might cling. 
The New Concept of Nature
These three events—global exploration and conquest, the rise of capitalism, and the development
of  modern science—and the changes  they effected in  and on the world had three important
consequences for the concept of nature. (These three consequences are not linked respectively to
the  three  events,  but  emerge  from the  interactions  of  their  entangled  histories  and are  each
contained  to  some  degree,  as  I  have  attempted  to  suggest,  within  each  event  and  more
specifically within the emergent phenomenon of world alienation as a whole.) First, nature is
externalized. It is no longer an experiential level in which the human exists, characterized by its
own principles and forms, but an environment in which one finds oneself, dictated by laws. It is a
class of beings rather than a mode of being, and humans are considered as either wholly separate
from that class or wholly subsumed under it. It is opposed to culture rather than constituting its
ontological basis and continuous material  source. It is likewise removed from the immediate
given of the senses and always hidden beyond and above the particular. It is the nature of the
Romantics.207
Thus, second, it is  universalized. This is not the general in the sense of that which is
shared among all things we actively perceive as belonging to the same species, but the universal
in the sense of embracing and explaining the particular, yet never visible and only approached by
hypothesis.  Nature is  conceived as  one universal  set  of laws that  are  everywhere applicable
regardless of regional variation. In fact, prior to the discovery of the Archimedean point, the
207 See McCarthy 1970. 
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earth and sky were always held to be sharply distinguished, governed by different principles. But
in its alienated form, natural laws cover even the movement of the stars:  “the same kind of
exterior  force  should  be  manifest  in  the  fall  of  terrestrial  and  the  movements  of  heavenly
bodies.”208 At its extreme, life itself is merely an epiphenomenon of physics differing in degree
only from the motion of all other matter. The new laws are “valid even beyond the coming into
existence of organic life and the earth herself.”209 
Third, nature is  historicized. By overemphasizing only one direction in its otherwise
cyclical motion, it is viewed as always reaching forward towards greater growth and surplus,
while even the steps of waste and decay are merely payments made toward an economically
greater  gain.  This  forward motion is  conceived as  a  law of nature guiding always toward a
desired future and away from an imagined past, whose history is discovered and interpreted in
scientific  study.  Evolutionary  laws  are  believed  to  guide  biological  variation  while
thermodynamic laws govern physical change. Science is able to distance itself sufficiently from
the human perspective to  conceive of natural  processes on a  universal  scale  and timeframe,
discovering thereby the historicity of the Earth and the gradual evolution of life. 
208 HC 258. 
209 HC 263.
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II: Everything is Possible
In this section, I show the ways in which totalitarianism draws on this new concept of nature
predicated on world alienation as it  emerged through historical  events.  First,  it  is  helpful  to
understand exactly how world alienation itself affected European civilization in such a way as to
prepare  it  for  totalitarianism  and  its  deployment  of  the  concept  of  nature.  For  Arendt,
totalitarianism was neither the result of a chain of cause and effect nor a repetition of some age-
old  pattern  or  form  of  government.  It  was,  rather,  something  new,  the  confluence  or
“crystallization” of many factors,  some of which belonging among the histories I  have been
tracing.210 Among these factors are: the development of race-thinking and the naturalization of
differences  in  human  diversity;  the  impending  collapse  of  the  nation-state  as  a  result  of
imperialism undermining its  political  legitimacy to  rule  over  a  specific  nationally  organized
territory;  backlash  from offshore  colonies  that  began  to  develop national  consciousness;  the
hyper-organization  of  the  state  and  industry  (mirrored  by  the  organizational  tendencies  of
modern  science)  and  its  creation  of  “stateless  people”;  the  creation  of  entire  classes  of
“superfluous” people by the relentless wheel of economic progress; the growing meaninglessness
of  ordinary  language  and  common-sense;  the  growing  powers  of  science  and  technology,
together with its emphasis on empirical testing and experimentation. 
The net effect of these changes—and the spiritual counterpart of world alienation—was
a ubiquitous sense of loneliness. Arendt contrasts loneliness with solitude, the latter occurring
when one is alone with oneself, free to engage in a “dialogue between me and myself”; “in
210 Hence her frustration over the title of her book, The Origins of Totalitarianism, which could never quite capture 
the vision of history, or causality, she proposed; hence also the confusion of her critics, who found it a most 
unusual style of argument (EU 403; Young-Bruehl 1982, 202). See “Understanding and Politics” for Arendt’s 
ideas about historiography and “crystallization” (EU 307-27). 
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solitude, [...] I am ‘by myself,’ together with my self, and therefore two-in-one.”211 While this
conversational solitude is fruitful, allowing one to engage in extended thinking, it also requires a
split  within  the  self,  which  leaves  one  uncertain  about  one’s identity.  It  therefore  ordinarily
demands a return to the company of others to complete itself, for in their presence one returns to
oneself as a single individual: “for the confirmation of my identity I depend entirely upon other
people; and it is the great saving grace of companionship for solitary men that it makes them
‘whole’ again, saves them from the dialogue of thought in which one remains always equivocal,
restores  the  identity  which  makes  them speak with  the  single  voice  of  one  unexchangeable
person.”212 By contrast, loneliness is the situation in which one is among others, yet at the same
unable to communicate, be heard or be seen. Referring to Epictetus, Arendt states that “the lonely
man (eremos) finds himself surrounded by others with whom he cannot establish contact or to
whose hostility he is exposed.”213 To be lonely is to find oneself expelled from a space in which
one can appear in one’s perfect uniqueness, be confirmed in one’s identity, and is offered a place
to  contribute  and  act.  It  is  when  others  are  everywhere  intervening  on  one’s  solitude,  yet
inaccessible and uncomprehending to one’s appearance. 
Loneliness occurs when the common world that connects us to others slips away.214  For
then the common sense by which we check the information of our senses against the common
world confirmed by other people is lost.215 Likewise, the capacity to work and act disappears,
since these are predicated on a stable world, while “only the sheer effort of labor which is the
211 OT 476.
212 OT 476. 
213 OT 476. 
214 Loneliness as an increasing concern in today’s society is of course no coincidence. What is most fascinating is 
how it is almost always conceived as a problem mainly to human health, as though the only issue with being 
lonely is that it could lead to digestive issues (e.g. Wright 2020). Cf. chapter 3. 
215 “Only because we have common sense, that is only because not one man, but men in the plural inhabit the earth 
can we trust our immediate sensual experience” (OT 476). 
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effort to keep alive is left and the relationship with the world as human artifice is broken.”216 In
The Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt described what she later came to call world alienation in
terms of “uprootedness and superfluousness,” stating that “to be uprooted means to have no
place in the world, recognized and guaranteed by others; to be superfluous means not to belong
to the world at all.”217 When an entire society is uprooted or deemed superfluous, the result is “a
society of men who, without a common world which would at once relate and separate them,
either live in desperate lonely separation or are pressed together into a mass. For a mass-society
is nothing more than that kind of organized living which automatically establishes itself among
human beings who are still related to one another but have lost the world once common to all of
them.”218 Mass society was the pervasive situation in pre-war Europe, while world alienation was
“the curse of modern masses since the beginning of the industrial revolution and [has] become
acute  with  the  rise  of  imperialism and social  traditions  in  our  own time.”219 In  The Human
Condition, Arendt complemented these considerations of the effects of colonialism, capitalism,
and imperialism with her astute study of the impact of the sciences on our basic trust in the
human  senses  and  appearance  in  general.  The  conclusion  is  that,  having  placed  a  distance
between themselves and the world, by transforming the earth into a globe, by turning land into
capital,  and  by  placing  technology  between  themselves  and  their  senses,  Western  peoples
gradually  eroded  their  capacity  to  connect  across  a  shared  experience  of  worldliness.  They
effectively staged an assault on the conditions of plurality. 
Arendt felt that loneliness was the basic experience underlying totalitarianism, which
can even be said to have “answered the needs” of lonely men living in a mass.220 On the basis of
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this increasingly everyday experience, the concept of nature came to play two major functions in
the emergence of totalitarianism: in the first, which is specific to the case of Nazi Germany,
nature is an ideology around which the movement rallies; in the second, which is a structural
feature of totalitarianism in general, nature is the model for the organization of a society as a
whole. 
Nature as Ideology
Totalitarianism “prepares” its subjects for domination through ideology and ideology is the last
mode of human understanding available to lonely people.221 An ideology is “quite literally [...] the
logic of an idea. Its subject matter is history, to which the ‘idea’ is applied; the result of this
application is not a body of statements about something that  is, but the unfolding of a process
which is in constant change. The ideology treats the course of events as though it followed the
same ‘law’ as the logical exposition of its ‘idea’.”222 The way an ideology functions is to pick an
idea,  or  more  specifically  a  given premise  (such as  “class  struggle”  or  “the  survival  of  the
fittest”),  and  pursue  its  consequences  through  a  rigorous  process  of  logical  reasoning  or
dialectics. The next step is to treat this line of reasoning as the law that dictates the movement of
all of history. As Arendt writes, “the movement of history and the logical process of this notion
are supposed to correspond to each other, so that whatever happens, happens according to the
logic of one ‘idea.’ However, the only possible movement in the realm of logic is the process of
deduction from a premise.”223 Because it proceeds by logical reasoning, the ideology conceives of
superfluous, one would rather be validated in that feeling than accept solutions to the sources of the problem, 
since the latter are typically empty promises or attended by paternalism. Ideology and terror make sense to a 
society that has been heading toward greater alienation and loneliness.
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all  reality  as  an  endless  process,  just  as  logic  constantly  produces  new  premises  from  the
conclusions derived from past premises. 
Ideological thinking is convincing to lonely people because, on the one hand, logical
reasoning is “the only capacity of the human mind which needs neither the self nor the other nor
the world in order to function safely.”224 Separated from others and uprooted from the world, a
lonely person can find some refuge in a system of thinking that by its perfect logic forces its
conclusions on the mind with the certainty of utter consistency. So long as the original premise
remains unquestioned, no corroboration from reality is required for ideological thinking to assert
its  legitimacy,  and  corroboration  is  precisely  what  loneliness  teaches  one  to  forego.
Consequently, “ideologies always assume that one idea is sufficient to explain everything in the
development from the premise, and that no experience can teach anything because everything is
comprehended in this consistent process of logical deduction.”225 On the other hand, ideologies
can be attractive in their universality, for so long as the same premise is accepted, any number of
people  will  derive  all  the  exact  same  conclusions.  Ideology  steps  in  as  a  surrogate  world,
something agreed upon that will unite otherwise atomized individuals. It therefore assumes the
character of a last resort for a civilization facing impending collapse, a “suicidal escape from this
reality [of everyday loneliness].”226
Among the “isms which to the satisfaction of their adherents can explain everything and
every occurrence by deducing it from a single premise,” the two that were fully developed into
totalitarian ideologies in Germany and Russia respectively were the nineteenth-century doctrines
of racism and communism.227 The latter will not concern us here. The former, derived from a
224 OT 477. 
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bastardization of Darwin’s evolutionary theory, functioned as a premise from which to deduce all
historical processes, particularly the eventual rule of a master race on earth and the elimination of
races “unfit  to live.”228 So whereas  the Boers  had submerged themselves  in  their  own racist
doctrine  of  nature,  they  still  trusted  that  their  supposed superiority  over  Indigenous  peoples
would be validated by natural laws (with the help of slavery); the Nazis, by contrast, transformed
racism into a law that their society would implement, actually bringing about the “survival of the
fittest” through genocide. Ironically, facing the impending collapse of a capitalist civilization that
partially  modelled  itself  on  the  processes  of  nature,  the  people  of  Germany  opted  into  an
ideology purporting to have unveiled the laws of nature and intending to play them out on a
global scale. 
Racism is a nature-ideology and if it purports to explain all the movements of history, it
is  only  because  in  “Darwin’s  introduction  of  the  concept  of  development  into  nature,  his
insistence that, at least in the field of biology, natural movement is not circular but unilinear,
moving in an infinitely progressing direction, [...] nature is, as it were, being swept into history,
that natural life is considered to be historical.”229 Needless to say, this is not at all what Darwin
had in mind, who would have been horrified by this misreading and misappropriation of his
ideas, and it is not through an inherent property that they lend themselves to ideological thinking
anymore  than  other  ideas  about  patterns  in  history.  Nonetheless,  it  is  only  an  alienated
perspective on the concept of nature that could allow itself  to set aside appearances and the
phenomenon of  plurality  and to  treat  human beings  as  merely  members  of  a  given race  or
species, which must either become supreme overlords or disposable vermin. Darwin’s theory
emerged in the context of world alienation as a universal, externalized, and historical concept of
228 OT 466. 
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nature, for it required a deliberate distancing to view biological life on a millenial timeframe
together  with  a  mapping  approach  to  life  forms,  and  this  combination  made  it  liable  to
deformation by the dogmas of racism. 
Such a concept of nature can become ideological in a way that the phenomenological
concept cannot. Ideological racism assumes that our natural existence is all that we are, that no
other  human  categories  or  qualities  are  of  any  relevance.  Yet  it  does  so  considering  our
naturalness not as the mode of existence we all share, whereby we all need to eat and sleep, to
labour and reproduce, but as the determinant of the class of beings to which we belong. We are
either  of  inferior  or  superior  nature,  depending  on  what  species  we  supposedly  represent.
Furthermore, whereas the phenomenological conception of nature reveals to us in appearances
that nature goes on swinging just as our daily labouring and consumption keeps us alive, the
ideological conception concludes that nature will dictate which of us is fated to live and which to
die  according  to  its  laws  of  movement,  based  not  on  appearances  but  on  supposed  hidden
essences. Lastly,  in its  externalization, the modern concept of nature can serve to justify the
“inevitability”  of  an  ideological  conclusion.  In  Arendt’s  phenomenology,  nature  is  the
precondition of our capacity to build a world and to act, a domain which we could collectively
choose how to treat to produce the world in which we want to live.  For ideologists,  on the
contrary, since natural laws are determined to be “above” all human design, being a process at
work behind appearance, but which we accidentally hinder in our stubborn human desire to act
freely,  it  follows that only by quenching human spontaneity will  nature’s laws become fully
active and its logical end realized on earth. 
Nature as Organizing Principle
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Loneliness is a “natural” state, in the sense that it precludes the specifically human capacities of
work and action and throws each person into the precarious state  of mere survival,  of  their
generalized existence as animal laborans indistinguishable one from the other.230 Without a world
in which to appear, one is also bereft of the ability to be confirmed in one’s specific identity. But
it is also a specifically human response to natural existence, for it arises from the recognition that
to be exclusively natural is not natural for human beings.231 Loneliness as a widespread condition
is the situation of human beings who are aware that despite their inherent uniqueness, their desire
to belong and to contribute to a world in their own way, they have been reduced to exchangeable
and superfluous creatures. Much as one ant is like all the others, one’s existence or extermination
mean nothing to the ant colony as a whole. Totalitarianism aspires to the universal superfluity of
human beings.232 Its appeal is in the assertion that, though one is no more valuable than a single
ant, at least it can demonstrate that the life or death of an ant is part of a universal process which
lends it validity and meaning. Totalitarianism deploys the tactics of organization to reduce all
human beings to the status of merely living, so that it can achieve its aim of turning the plurality
of human beings into “One Man of gigantic dimensions,” while its subjects consent in the hopes
that such an organization will integrate them into something higher than their mere existence.233 
Besides the choice of ideology which dictates the “natural laws” meant to govern the
activities of the totalitarian society, the form of totalitarian governance is itself modelled on a
concept of what is natural. I do not mean here Arendt’s image of the onion, which is perhaps only
coincidentally  how  she  described  totalitarian  organization.234 Rather,  I  refer  to  the  constant
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movement  of  the  totalitarian  system,  which,  unlike  the  swinging  motion  of  nature,  follows
instead  the  image  of  nature  as  an  unfolding  unilinear  process.  The  eighteenth-century
revolutionaries  conjectured  an imaginary  “state  of  nature,”  which  was  meant  to  provide  the
hypothetical  backdrop  and  permanent  source  of  the  civil  law  they  would  put  into  place. 235
Totalitarianism instead attempts to directly institute the state of nature as the organizing principle
of society, since it is supposedly higher and truer than any human law, and it imagines such a
state as a constant process leading inexorably toward a final end.236 As Arendt writes, “totalitarian
lawfulness,  defying  legality  and  pretending  to  establish  the  direct  reign  of  justice  on  earth,
executes the law of History or of Nature without translating it into standards of right and wrong
for individual behavior.”237 Totalitarianism is headed by “movements” rather than by parties. Like
capitalist wealth accumulation, totalitarian power accumulation must keep moving or crumble:
“if they do not pursue global rule as their ultimate goal, they are only too liable to lose whatever
power they have already seized.”238 
Further,  what  totalitarianism perfects  is  the  form of  government  by  decrees,  which
initially developed in connection to colonial bureaucracies.239 In order to respect the unfolding of
the natural law of becoming, totalitarian leaders must continually undermine any semblance of
permanence, eliminate the formation of any legal system that would bring order to society, and
silence any evidence that seems to contradict its claim to total validity. As Arendt reminds us,
“one should not forget that only a building can have a structure, but that a movement [...] can
have  only  a  direction,  and  that  any  form of  legal  or  governmental  structure  can  be  only  a
handicap to a movement which is being propelled with increasing speed in a certain direction”
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and “a stabilization of its laws and institutions would surely liquidate the movement itself and
with it the hope for eventual world conquest.”240 The rule of process is meant to dictate the shape
of society directly, without any translation into the stability of a legal and political framework,
such  that  all  decrees  are  made  on  an  ad  hoc basis.  The  totalitarian  society  is  deliberately
“shapeless” as  in  the realm of  nature where all  is  interconnected without  any clear  ruler  or
hierarchy.241 This in turn means that no one can at any time determine whether what they do is
lawful  or  not,  whether  it  will  demand  punishment  at  some  later  date  when  it  becomes
retroactively illegal. Subjects of totalitarian domination are placed into a day-to-day insecurity,
never sure of whether they, or their families, will tomorrow be targeted by the regime; the best
they can do is try to fulfill their orders as closely as possible and hope that they will be forgiven
for having tried to protect themselves, even if this means killing others. 
Along with the constant flow of unclear orders, totalitarian powers achieve their aim of
ensuring the perpetual movement of the system and the insecurity and superfluity of its subjects
through the method of multiplying every role in society, so that at any given time, various offices
complete the same functions and tasks. “The inhabitant of Hitler’s Third Reich,” writes Arendt,
“lived under not only the simultaneous and often conflicting authorities of competing powers
[...], he could never be sure and was never explicitly told  whose  authority he was supposed to
place  above  all  others.”242 Much  as  in  nature,  where  organisms  typically  produce  far  more
240 OT 398, 391.
241 To the rejoinder that there is an obvious leader in both totalitarian regimes, Arendt rebutted that “the Leader 
represents the movement in a way totally different from all ordinary party leaders; he claims personal 
responsibility for every action, deed, or misdeed, committed by any member or functionary in his official 
capacity. This total responsibility is the most important organizational aspect of the so-called Leader principle, 
according to which every functionary is not only appointed by the Leader but is his walking embodiment, and 
every order is supposed to emanate from this one ever-present source. This thorough identification of the Leader
with every appointed subleader and this monopoly of responsibility for everything which is being done are also 
the most conspicuous signs of the decisive difference between a totalitarian leader and an ordinary dictator or 
despot” (OT 374). In the fabricated version of nature created by totalitarian regimes, Nature’s supreme laws 
order each individual directly, while the leader is no more a head than any other, except that they are the 
manifestation of Nature should others’ direct access to Nature be clouded by other considerations. 
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offspring  than  is  strictly  required  for  the  reproduction  of  the  species,  so  too  the  totalitarian
movement ensured its resilience and control through the multiplication of every strata of society:
“a continuous competition between offices,  whose functions not  only overlap but  which are
charged  with  identical  tasks,  gives  opposition  or  sabotage  almost  no  chance  to  become
effective.”243 And just as natural over-reproduction has evolved in the expectation that most of the
offspring will die prematurely in their scramble for maturity, the duplication of offices exists so
that at any time one may be dispensed with to fulfill some secret requirement deduced from an
ideological line of reasoning. Writes Arendt, “the multiplication of offices was extremely useful
for the constant shifting of power; the longer, moreover, a totalitarian regime stays in power, the
greater becomes the number of offices and the possibility of jobs exclusively dependent upon the
movement, since no one office is abolished when its authority is liquidated,” until, to be sure, its
members are executed at a later date without any clue as to why.244 Unlike capitalism, which is
interested in harnessing the profit potential of labouring, totalitarianism reflects the experience of
those  capitalism neglects  in  its  single-minded attention  on  the  growth aspect  of  nature.  For
totalitarianism embodies the way in which growth always occurs at the cost of enormous waste,
and in fact implemented wastefulness and impracticality in its transformation of society into a
mass of superfluous people. Constantly undermining the normal prerogatives of economics—
profitability,  efficiency,  flexibility—it  makes  everything equally expendable  to  the process  it
243 OT 404. 
244 OT 401, 404. The increasing dependence of jobs on the state apparatus ensured, as Arendt points it in 
“Organized Guilt and Collective Responsibility,” that at a certain point everyone is implicated in some way in 
the carrying out of crimes against humanity (EU 121-132). The gradual elimination of public individuality and 
the reliance on each person’s basic need to protect their private interests meant that the “jobholder” became the 
ideal subject of totalitarian regimes and the most reliable agent to carry out genocidal plans. This organization of
the masses into one collective system, fuelled by the basest instincts of each of its members, is a deliberate 
reproduction of a “state of nature,” guided always by the perceived laws that would direct it towards the 
“survival of the fittest.” Can any one lion be blamed if the gazelle goes extinct? 
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supposedly incarnates, even at the cost of its own success, as when Nazi Germany deployed
military personnel urgently needed in the war to carry out the genocide of the Jews.245
However, the most crucial method by which totalitarianism models itself on nature is by
stripping its subjects of their civil and political personhood, effectively reducing them to their
naked  existence.  Any  semblance  of  worldliness  that  survived  the  gradual  alienation  of  the
preceding centuries is systematically destroyed by the instruments of terror. The ways in which
totalitarian regimes destroyed normal life for its subjects, by pressing them together into a mass
connected  not  by  a  common  world  but  by  an  ideology  and  a  ceaseless  movement,  by
undermining all possibility of authentic relationships through the use of secret polices and auto-
surveillance measures, and so on, pale in consideration with the total domination exercised in the
camps.  In  Arendt’s  view,  “the  concentration  and  extermination  camps  [...]  serve  as  the
laboratories  in  which  the  fundamental  belief  of  totalitarianism that  everything is  possible  is
verified,” while the ultimate aim of a totalitarian movement would be the transformation of the
entire globe into one large concentration camp.246 As Arendt writes, “it is in the very nature of
totalitarian regimes to demand unlimited power. Such power can only be secured if literally all
men, without a single exception,  are reliably dominated in every aspect of their  life.”247 The
concentration camp is the institutionalization of a radical loneliness and thus the fulfillment of
the totalitarian dream.
In the camps, people are “reduced to a never-changing identity of reactions, so that each
of these bundles of reactions can be exchanged at random for any other.”248 This is accomplished
first by disconnecting its residents from the outside world, enclosing them within an environment
245 OT 404, 409-12.  
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that is under complete control. In the concentration camp, one is made to feel as if in a dream,
without any solid connection to the outside world and without the capacity to act freely.249 Next
comes the gradual breakdown of the juridical person, which seeks to find some justice, or at least
a civil logic, in one’s fate. Criminals are denied trial and punishment, and political dissenters,
criminals, and perfectly innocent people are thrown together for no humanly comprehensible
reason.250 Then, the moral person is murdered.  In the camps, martyrdom is made impossible,
insurrection meaningless and useless. Meanwhile, inmates are implicated in the functioning of
the machine of mass murder or made to make morally unbearable choices. “Through the creation
of conditions under which conscience ceases to be adequate and to do good becomes utterly
impossible,”  writes  Arendt,  “the  consciously  organized  complicity  of  all  men  in  crimes  of
totalitarian regimes is extended to the victims and thus made total.”251 Finally, any markers of
individuality are removed, such that inmates lose any sense of uniqueness and therefore any
appreciation of their capacity for spontaneity. This is achieved through humiliating conditions,
the removal of markers of difference such as hair, and torture. Writes Arendt, “the aim of all
these methods [...] is to manipulate the human body—with its infinite possibilities of suffering—
in such a way as to make it destroy the human person as inexorably as do certain mental diseases
of  organic  origin.252 The  superfluity  of  human  existence  and  plurality  is  carried  to  its  final
conclusion in the total reduction of human beings to the imagined state of nature in which all are
against all and everything happens without meaning.
Totalitarian  regimes  learned  racism  and  bureaucratic  rule-by-decree  from  colonial
experiments.  They  took  over  the  “unnatural  growth  of  the  natural”  from  capitalist  growth
249 OT 438.
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economics, expanding it to include the excessive waste and superfluity that attend evolution and
growth. Their  knack for organization and their  use of experimentation was learned from the
natural sciences.253  But totalitarianism goes beyond the point of placing itself outside the earth so
as to perceive nature from the Archimedean point, creating the conditions to test its hypotheses
about how nature truly is. Totalitarianism attempts to enact its version of nature, and in this way
takes from the emerging science of its day, which began to “act into nature.”254 This is what
marks the full realization of, and thus the conclusive break with, the modern age, placing us who
have known totalitarianism and quantum science on the other side of a gaping abyss from all
prior  history.  The  central  belief  of  totalitarianism,  which  it  learned  from the  dramatic  new
directions of modern science, looking optimistically at its new potential to unleash cosmic forces
on earth, is that “everything is possible.”255
Malleable Nature
The camps are centres for the “mass production of corpses,” people who have been turned into
“a mere thing, into something that even animals are not; for Pavlov’s dog, which as we know
was trained to eat not when it was hungry but when a bell rang, was a perverted animal.”256 In
this sense, totalitarianism goes far beyond the view of nature as it had developed in the modern
age.  Not  only  is  nature  universal,  externalized,  and  historical,  but  it  is  in  fact  malleable.
Attempting  only  to  bring  about  what  the  ideology  dictated  should  be  the  case  anyway,
totalitarianism accidentally stumbled on a method to change what is. Although, Arendt points
253 “It is indeed, as Whitehead once remarked, ‘no accident that an age of science developed into an age of 
organisation. Organised thought is the basis of organised action,’ not, one is tempted to add, because thought is 
the basis of action but rather because modern science as ‘the organisation of thought’ introduced an element of 
action into thinking” (HC 271n26). 
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out, “until now, the totalitarian belief that everything is possible seems to have proved only that
everything can be destroyed.”257 In the camps, the totalitarian regimes operated their experiments
in transforming human nature.  What  is  clear  from all  appearances  is  that  human beings  are
endlessly unique, or in other words, that human nature is precisely not to have any one defining
feature. Yet, as Arendt writes, “the experience of the concentration camps does show that human
beings can be transformed into specimens of the human animal, and that man’s ‘nature’ is only
‘human’ insofar as it opens up to man the possibility of becoming something highly unnatural,
that  is,  a  man.”258 By  creating  a  place  in  which  human  plurality  is  utterly  eliminated,
totalitarianism effectively alters human nature; it produces something that is no longer properly
human  and  no longer  properly  natural,  for  to  become exclusively  natural  is,  for  humans,  a
perversion of nature. 
The totalitarian version of nature is in many ways antiquated, a distortion of a scientific
theory already problematic, yet its attempt to enact nature, to bring about its idealized nature
against all appearances, was ahead of its time. This active engagement with nature is a far cry
from the care-taking approach outlined in chapter 1. From a phenomenological perspective, one
appreciates that nature is a distinct mode of existence to which humans belong with all other
living and moving processes and that this form of existence is the basis for the erection of a
human world in which one can act. Consequently, efforts to make that world as one wishes must
take into consideration how nature is prepared for the world, and this consideration takes the
form of a political process in which art and judgment play a key role. By contrast, the radical
alienation, or loneliness, that lies at the heart of totalitarianism can see nature as nothing more
than  another  field  of  intervention,  in  which  to  unleash  processes,  manipulate  developments,
257 OT 459. 
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“pervert” animals, and otherwise attempt to arrange destiny. Similarly, acting on human beings,
this form of engagement does not seek to “resolve” the bodily condition of necessity, which is
doomed to failure (as in the French Revolution) but not inherently evil; rather it wishes to re-
create bodies in the way one imagines they “ought” to be. In my reading, this is an early form of
“acting  into  nature,”  by  which  Arendt  describes  the  new  frontiers  of  science  in  the  early
twentieth century. 
What  the  totalitarian  experiment  exposes  is  that  withdrawal  from  appearances  is
implicitly a rejection of human plurality. If there is always some more “real” process hiding
away behind appearances, it follows that the different perspectives that different people take on
one same thing are null,  for these perspectives are all equally illusions relative to the reality
which we cannot perceive. A phenomenological approach to developing concepts, that is, one
based on the primacy of appearance, deems it legitimate that each person should look for patterns
and  repetitions  in  appearances,  tie  these  to  a  given concept,  and take  that  definition  to  the
community of peers who corroborate, supplement, critique, and integrate that concept through a
sharing of perspectives. By contrast, alienation judges each person’s sensory experience equally
invalid before the evidence of technological intervention, which consistently demonstrates that
we can  never  know what  the  “real”  meaning of  a  concept  is.  As  Arendt  concludes,  “if  the
sameness of the object can no longer be discerned, no common nature of men, least of all the
unnatural  conformism of  a  mass  society,  can prevent  the  destruction of  the  common world,
which is usually preceded by the destruction of the many aspects in which it presents itself to
human plurality.”259 If I touch the trunk of the proverbial elephant, and you touch its tail, our




In the face of such confusion, ideologies seem to offer a redeeming thoroughness, by
starting from a conjecture about a real process and deducing from it a perfect explanation for all
phenomena, regardless of whether these seem to agree with the ideology or not (since they are
just illusions anyway). Under these conditions, no added perspectives are needed, as these would
only confuse the perfect consistency of the ideology. And consequently, if the process hidden
behind  appearances  is  to  be  fully  manifest,  all  human  plurality  and  spontaneity  must  be
abolished. If “everything is possible” now that we can see behind the appearances that hid from
us our true potential, then one single person should suffice to know and do everything; there is
no need for the plurality of human beings on the planet, each bringing their unique individual
selves to a common world. 
81
CHAPTER 3
Life as the Highest Good
In the aftermath of the Second World War, while totalitarianism had been defeated in Germany
and was slowly imploding in the Soviet Union, Western countries largely returned to their old
ways, more self-sure then ever since their victory had proven they were on “the right side.”
Failing to recognize in what ways they replicated conditions in pre-Hitler Germany, they did not
feel the need to make fundamental  systemic changes.  What they really  ignored was that,  as
Hannah Arendt  would have said,  while  the rise of  totalitarianism did occur  in  Germany for
specific, historical reasons, it in no way followed that it was a “German” tendency or problem
(and the same goes for Russia). Totalitarianism now exists as a possibility in the modern world
because of certain irreducible historical facts and changes to the human condition, with which
the entire human world must contend. So far, it would seem Western countries have managed to
avoid  a  new totalitarianism,  in  Arendt’s  definition  of  the  term,  though the  number  of  other
atrocities  that  have  been  committed  since  is  sickening  enough.  However,  what  remains  are
histories of accruing world alienation, by which the concept of nature continues to inform the
way we structure our society, even as we rewrite the content of the concept. To this has been
added an extraordinary power,  the power to  act  into  nature,  which  we should by no means
consider confined to the totalitarian past. In many ways, Nature continues to be the dominant
model for our society’s institutions and the principal setting for our most radical experiments. 
There is an apparent contradiction in the story I have been telling so far. At the dawn of
the modern age, nature escaped its bounds outside the worldly sphere and insinuated its logic
into  every  domain  of  human  existence,  until  the  systems that  structure  every  aspect  of  our
existence, our social and racial categories, our economies, our sciences, and our politics, take on
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the form of forces of nature. These new institutions are outside our control, riding on their own
momentum, endlessly growing and evolving, throbbing and swinging with the lifeforce of each
of  us  as  we  contribute  to  their  infinite  generative  and  integrative  capacities.  They  have  an
irrevocable quality; they are the product of human efforts yet somehow more real, more intuitive
than anything we might wish to replace them with. They have become natural to us. But the
contradiction is that, to all appearances, the domain that stands to lose the most from activities
undertaken under the umbrella of these same systems is the natural world, both human and non-
human.  Adding to  the threat  of  totalitarianism, a  new danger  looms on the horizon:  that  of
complete ecological catastrophe. 
I have stated a few times now that we are facing an environmental crisis. Yet, the exact
nature of the crisis eludes many of us, with conflicting information provided by the media and
the scientific  establishment,  misdirected or  mistaken arguments deployed by all  sides,  and a
range of issues whose connections are fuzzy at best. Is the issue climate change? Biodiversity
loss? Pollution and resource depletion? How is it connected to political and economic structures?
To  many,  this  crisis  does  not  feel  real  at  all.  Aren’t  natural  disasters  commonplace?  Don’t
planetary temperatures fluctuate as a matter of course? Why does it matter if it  gets warmer
again? Isn’t extinction just a part of natural selection and aren’t we just proving our superiority
over other animals? If mistakes like a tailings dam spill or a reactor explosion occur, can’t we
just tighten up security and precautions and leave it at that? Aren’t estimates of resource scarcity
overplayed and, anyway, can’t we just keep recycling old things if we run out of resources?
Those who argue for recognition of a crisis cannot seem to agree on what we mean when we talk
about “environmental issues,” while those who disagree find ample ambiguity to exploit in their
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refusals. In one sense, then, it seems the environmental crisis is in fact a crisis about what the
environment is and how we are impacting it—in other words, a crisis of understanding. 
In  this  chapter,  I  shall  endeavour  to  resolve  the  contradiction  mentioned  above  by
showing how the environmental crisis is in part a result of attempting to replace nature as it
stands with an alienated model of it; this is achieved both by transforming society to match a
vision of “ideal” nature, as well as by moulding nature itself to that ideal. I conjecture a third
concept of nature which, derived from the labouring mode of activity, is stripped of its material
content by its disconnection to the world, thus reorganizing human collectivity as a “society of
laborers.”260 I wish to recast, one last time, Arendt’s concept of nature as it stands, quasi-purified,
as the ideal of contemporary society, which in turn poses the greatest threat to natural organisms
and processes we have ever seen. The last concept of nature is not a phenomenological aspect of
being,  nor  a  scientific  hypothesis,  nor  an  ideology,  but  an  abstract  value—Life  itself.  In
contemporary times, life takes precedence over all other notions of the good. In contemporary
society,  all  productive  efforts  are  directed  toward  the  continuance  of  life,  while  the  new
capacities of technology are deployed for the elimination of death.  I  will  also consider how
Arendt approached crisis as an opportunity to make constructive change and I will examine some
obstacles that the present system throws up against such change.
History of a Value
Hannah Arendt states in  The Human Condition  that, of the various principles of value derived
from the various activities and capacities corresponding to the human condition, nothing is so
precious to the modern sensibility as life itself. We believe in “life as the highest good.”261 The
260 HC 46 and passim.
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story begins, unsurprisingly, with the Greeks. In their discovery of the vita activa, which Arendt
finds permeating all of Eurowestern history, language, and culture, they recognized themselves
as different from the natural world that surrounded them, even as they shared in animal life on a
certain level. Compared to immortal nature and the immortal gods of Olympus, human beings
noted their own mortality. Unlike animals and plants who, though they die, live on as a species in
which each individual is no different from the others, and gods who, though they have individual
existence, never die, the Greeks recognized that human beings are each utterly unique and that
their death is therefore the irrevocable and radical destruction of something that would never
again  exist.  “Imbedded  in  a  cosmos  where  everything  was  immortal,  mortality  became  the
hallmark of human existence,” as Arendt expresses it.262 But humans could attain immortality
through their own avenue, “their ability to produce things—works and deeds and words.”263 And
for  Arendt  the  search  for  immortality  was  the  reference  point  for  the  value  of  each human
activity; the goodness of an activity was measured according to its capacity to impart immortality
on its doer. Thus, by a strange paradox, the only way for humans to be immortal is to separate
ourselves from immortal nature and exercise the worldly activities of work and action. Those
who occupied their lives with labour alone, according to the Greeks, were considered merely
natural  and  their  death  would  not  be  a  significant  loss.264 Properly  human immortality  was
necessarily worldly. 
A change  occurred  once  the  philosophers  discovered  contemplation  and  found  that
eternity, by contrast with immortality, could be accessed by turning away from both nature and
world. In speechless wonder, the philosopher experienced an eternal reality that transcends this
world altogether, and this experience outside of time was deemed more real than any immortality
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within temporal existence could ever be.265 The discovery of the  vita contemplativa, however,
would not oust the primacy of action until the end of Antiquity, when the immortality of the
human-made world was put in question. It was at this time, when Rome, the Immortal City,
began to collapse, that trust in the vita activa began to wane and Christianity took on increasing
importance as it preached the vanity of all worldly striving and the immortality of life ensured by
an eternal God.266 
The belief in life as the highest good has its roots in the Christian worldview, which
“has survived, and has even remained completely unshaken by, secularization and the general
decline  of  the  Christian  faith.”267 At  the  centre  of  this  worldview  is  the  revelation  of  the
sacredness  of  individual  human  life,  which  itself  is  a  reversal  of  the  “ancient  relationship
between man and world” in which humans are the only mortal things within an immortal world.
Now, the world was continually passing away and would someday end completely, but individual
lives  were  assured  of  immortality  through  the  grace  of  God.  Allying  itself  with  the  vita
contemplativa of the philosophers, Christianity dictated that immortality was in fact ensured by
the eternal. The God that surpasses this world, by contrast with the gods who coexist with human
beings, is the ultimate source of any potential immortality. This view structured society in the
West  throughout  the  Middle  Ages,  which,  even  though  it  had  not  yet  suffered  the  world
alienation that put into doubt all the evidence of reason and the senses, was suspicious of the
capacity  of  the  world  to  impart  meaning to  human existence  and therefore  downplayed the
activities of work and, especially,  action.  Basing itself  on the values  of faith,  charity,  and a
goodness that hides from the view of others,268 the Middle Ages were defined generally by the
265 HC 19. 
266 HC 21. 
267 HC 314. 
268 HC 74. 
86
search for God in contemplation and immortality in the life to come. Work and action persisted
but were ancillary to the overall structuring of society. 
The  modern  age  challenged  this  arrangement.  Galileo’s  discovery  brought  about
Cartesian doubt, which affected not only our relationship to the world, but to contemplation too,
since access to the eternal is equally predicated on the senses, namely “the eyes of the mind
which can see the sky of ideas or the voice of conscience listened to by the human heart.” 269
Thus, contemplation was stripped of its authority in providing access to eternity: 
After  being  and  appearance  had  parted  company  and  truth  was  no  longer
supposed  to  appear,  to  reveal  and  disclose  itself  to  the  mental  eye  of  the
beholder, there arose a veritable necessity to hunt for truth behind deceptive
appearances. Nothing indeed could be less trustworthy for acquiring knowledge
and approaching truth than passive observation or mere contemplation. In order
to be certain one had to make sure, and in order to know one had to do.270
Nevertheless, the system of values did not revert to what it had been prior to the Middle Ages.
Though contemplation was humiliated and replaced by an urge to produce knowledge, thereby
elevating the active life once again, the latter suffered its own internal reversal. The worldly
activities were just as threatened by the new distrust of the senses as contemplation, with labour
alone surviving the assault. 
Furthermore, “the modern reversal operated within the fabric of a Christian society,”
and thus the emancipation of the vita activa from the vita contemplativa, was incorporated within
the earlier Christian reversal of life and world.271 The Christian sacredness of life was originally
269 BPF 54.
270 HC 290. Emphasis in original. 
271 HC 314. This sentiment was echoed later by Ivan Illich, who argued that modern society is defined by an 
attempt to institutionalize the values it has inherited from Christianity. Thus, for example, rather than serve the 
hungry, we pay taxes so that the government can establish and fund soup kitchens to do so on our behalf. Illich 
finds this situation abhorrent and a distortion of the good things intended by the Christian spirit and finds many 
compelling arguments to denounce the failure of these structures. What is significant, however, is his repeated 
claim that the “corruption of the best is the worst” (Corruptio optimi quae est pessima), meaning in part that the 
worst things result from the misapplication of the best intentions. The modern world contains so many evils, he 
believes, because it distorts the Christian message from the highest calling of individual charity and forgiveness 
into a system of enforced aid. He finds that the modern preoccupation with life, divorced from the notion of gift 
and grace that justified its placement at the height of human values, constitutes an idol.
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prevented from becoming a morbid obsession with death by the promise of everlasting life in the
next world as much as by the unquestioned value of contemplation,  which characterized the
Middle Ages and resulted from the early alliance of Christian theology with Greek philosophy.
But  the  prizing  of  life  over  world  was  not  inseparable  from  these  factors.  Life  remained
paramount, but only because it could be recognized in the activity of labour as well as in the
hereafter. Thus, Arendt writes, 
no matter how articulate and how conscious the thinkers of modernity were in
their attacks on tradition, the priority of life over everything else had acquired
for them the status of a ‘self-evident truth,’ and as such it has survived even in
our present world,  which has begun already to leave the whole modern age
behind and to substitute for a laboring society the society of jobholders. But
while it is quite conceivable that the development following upon the discovery
of the Archimedean point would have taken an altogether different direction if
it had taken place seventeen hundred years earlier, when not life but the world
was still the highest good of man, it by no means follows that we still live in a
Christian world. For what matters today is not the immortality of life, but that
life is the highest good.272
In our time,  immortality  has ceased to capture the imagination:  we know all  worldly things
perish eventually, we cannot trust the vision of eternity, and we cannot believe anymore in an
afterlife. Yet unleashed from its attachment to embodied human beings, life grew into an abstract
value, which merely runs through us and has to be preserved in us, over and above our own
political  and artistic  capacities. Without  belief  in  an afterlife  to  legitimize  the sacredness  of
personal lives, we take desperate measures to extend this-worldly life on a general level. The
futility of this effort produces the unshakeable anxiety at the heart of modern existence. 
Illich’s debt to Arendt is unstated as far as I know, but I have found one reference to his having read and 
admired her work. It is to be found in the introduction to Ordres et Désordres (1982) by Jean-Pierre Dupuy, 
Illich’s French translator and friend. Dupuy tells the story of visiting Illich at his home in Mexico, where he 
enthusiastically presses a copy of The Human Condition into Dupuy’s hands.
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As I noted in the previous chapter, the full practical ramifications of modern science
were unforeseen, even by the small group of learned people who appreciated its spiritual and
theoretical consequences at the time. World alienation, which was sparked by a few key events
but  took  centuries  to  play  out  in  the  various  realms  of  human  life,  only  pervaded  all  of
Eurowestern society around the early twentieth century. Through the long centuries that preceded
this  pervasiveness,  a  history  can  be  traced  in  which  the  notion  of  life  as  the  highest  good
gradually transforms all of worldly existence into a ceaseless labour while scientific endeavours
change  in  the  opposite  direction,  becoming  increasingly  concerned  with  action.  This
development culminated in the rise of totalitarianism and the use of atom bombs, which are like
the opening ceremony announcing the complete victory of life as the highest good that defines
the new age in which we now live. In my view, the two tendencies by which labour dominates
everyday life while science employs the methods of action are at the core of the environmental
crisis, which can thus be traced back to the sole preoccupation with life. 
Life Contra Nature
Labour is the activity that corresponds to the human condition of life. Consequently, in a context
of world alienation, labour assumes the highest place among human activities: “the modern age
has carried with it a theoretical glorification of labor and has resulted in a factual transformation
of the whole of society into a laboring society.”273 The institutional shape this took, which I
analyzed in chapter 2 in its specifically economical form as capitalism, is what Arendt more
generally calls “the rise of the social.”274 As she writes, “society [in a technical sense] is the form
in which the fact of mutual dependence for the sake of life and nothing else assumes public
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significance and where the activities connected with sheer survival are permitted to appear in
public.”275 The social realm, as it gradually devoured both the private and the political spheres,
“transformed all modern communities into societies of laborers and jobholders; in other words,
they became at once centered around the one activity necessary to sustain life.”276 One by one, the
other activities were reduced to mere labouring: “Action was soon and still is almost exclusively
understood in terms of making and fabricating, only that making, because of its worldliness and
inherent  indifference  to  life,  was  now  regarded  as  but  another  form  of  laboring,  a  more
complicated but not a more mysterious function of the life process.”277 
All activities are therefore structured and managed as forms of labour, regardless of the
discrepancies  in  the  actual  shape  these  activities  take.  “Even  presidents,  kings,  and  prime
ministers think of their offices in terms of a job necessary for the life of society, and among the
intellectuals, only solitary individuals are left who consider what they are doing in terms of work
and not in terms of making a living,” writes Arendt.278 The emphasis is on perspective, not on the
actual nature of the activity; this is an institutional change, not a material one: “to have a society
of laborers, it is of course not necessary that every member actually be a laborer or worker [...]
but only that all members consider whatever they do primarily as a way to sustain their own lives
and those of their families.”279 This occurs when people are divorced from the results of their
activities and attend exclusively to the activity itself as a means to sustain life. 
This has important environmental consequences. Resource extraction,  manufacturing,
social  work, or administration are equally legislated as forms of labour and compensated by
exclusively monetary means. Yet while money circulates endlessly, in an imitation of the natural
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cycle,  these activities have dramatically different  effects  on natural  systems. In an industrial
society, the products of our labour have incommensurate impacts on the natural environment
which are not reflected in their cost. Only the human contribution to the process of bringing a
commodity or a service to a customer is considered, while the depletion of resources, waste by-
or end-products, and energetic consumption are ignored. Likewise, if all activities, regardless of
whether they directly ensure the life process of the actor (i.e., regardless of whether they are
authentically labour), are legislated and managed as labour, then the objects of work have to be
produced at  least  as quickly as the goods of labour.  But as the goods of labour are  quickly
consumed  and  returned  to  the  natural  cycle,  the  objects  of  work  accrue.  “The  process  can
continue,” Arendt points out, “only provided that no worldly durability and stability is permitted
to interfere, only as long as all worldly things, all end products of the production process, are fed
back into it at an ever-increasing speed,” and if they cannot be fed back they are expelled.280 The
durability of products produced by work is treated as undesirable, since it inhibits the process
character that is supposed to reign in the economy. The very idea of durability is written out of
our  relation  to  the  object,  whose  “life-span”  does  not  cover  its  millennium-spanning
decomposition. Writes Arendt, “under modern conditions, not destruction but conservation spells
ruin because the very durability of conserved objects is the greatest impediment to the turnover
process, whose constant gain in speed is the only constancy left wherever it has taken hold.”281
Durability becomes the exclusive prerogative of waste. It is a “waste economy,” as Arendt calls
it.282 What is consumed is, in many cases, a by-product of the work process as it slowly produces
durable waste. Thus, for example, e-waste, plastics, nuclear waste, and greenhouse gases, are the
end-products  of  a  process  which  was  enjoyed  as  connectivity,  convenience,  power,  or
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transportation. Many environmental issues—pollution, ocean acidification, climate change, and
so on—can be interpreted as the effects of a banished world clogging up nature’s capacity to
reintegrate  waste  into  the  life  process.  Forgetting  that  what  we as  humans do  is  more  than
natural, we transform our worldliness into a life process, thereby infringing on many other life
processes in nature. 
While the refusal to recognize the incommensurable material properties of work and
labour explains some of modern society’s harmful effects  on natural processes, it  would not
amount to as much if it were not for a destructive relentlessness at work within labour itself. As
Arendt writes, 
the laboring activity, though under all circumstances connected with the life
process  in  its  most  elementary,  biological  sense,  remained  stationary  for
thousands of years, imprisoned in the eternal recurrence of the life process to
which it was tied. The admission of labor to public stature, far from eliminating
its character as a process—which one might have expected, remembering that
bodies politic have always been designed for permanence and their laws always
understood  as  limitations  imposed  upon  movement—has,  on  the  contrary,
liberated this process from its circular, monotonous recurrence and transformed
it into a swiftly progressing development whose results have in a few centuries
totally changed the whole inhabited world.283
This  is  because,  for  the  first  time,  the  social  body  is  identified  with  the  life  process. In  a
perspective that can only be achieved through deliberate alienation, we no longer judge and act
on the world from our own embodied perspective, but in consideration of the whole society as
one large organism. As Arendt writes, “socialized mankind is that state of society where only one
interest rules, and the subject of this interest is either classes or man-kind, but neither man nor
men. [...] What was left was a ‘natural force,’ the force of the life process itself, to which all men
and all human activities were equally submitted [...] and whose only aim, if it had an aim at all,
was survival of the animal species man.”284 Yet this situation is untenable, holding within it the
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seeds of its own destruction. Arendt points out that “the monolithic character of every type of
society, its conformism which allows for only one interest and one opinion, is ultimately rooted
in the one-ness of man-kind. It is because this one-ness of man-kind is not fantasy and not even
merely a scientific hypothesis [...] that mass society, where man as a social animal rules supreme
and where apparently the survival of the species could be guaranteed on a world-wide scale, can
at the same time threaten humanity with extinction”285 
The situation calls to mind an image offered by Arendt near the end of  The Human
Condition.  She  states  that  “if,  in  concluding,  we  return  once  more  to  the  discovery  of  the
Archimedean point and apply it, as Kafka warned us not to do, to man himself and to what he is
doing on this earth, it at once becomes manifest that all his activities, watched from a sufficiently
removed  vantage  point  in  the  universe,  would  appear  not  as  activities  of  any  kind  but  as
processes, so that, as a scientist recently put it, modern motorization would appear like a process
of biological mutation in which human bodies gradually begin to be covered by shells of steel.”286
Contemporary  techno-scientific  society  imagines  itself  from  the  outside,  from  an  alienated
position, as just such evolving organisms: “we look and live in this society as though we were as
far  removed  from  our  own  human  existence  as  we  are  from  the  infinitely  small  and  the
immensely  large.”287 All  of  human  civilization  appears  as  the  development  of  a  particularly
resilient, and frankly invasive, species.288 The perpetual growth of the human population and its
power,  reach,  and  unanimity  would  constitute  an  overly-healthy  example  of  an  organism
adapting to changing circumstances and outwitting its competitors. 
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For  Arendt,  this  is  no  mere  metaphor.  In  the  previous  chapter,  I  detailed  just  how
widespread  the  superfluity  of  individual  lives  became  during  the  modern  age,  due  to  the
reduction of all human existence to natural existence, and that this constituted the creation of a
mass-society.  From a  political  point  of  view,  the  danger  to  humanity  lies  in  the  attempt  to
sediment  this  situation,  forcibly  eliminating  the  spontaneity  of  human  beings  and  thereby
effectively  destroying  human  nature,  even  as  natural  existence  is  preserved.  From  an
environmental point of view, mass society is equally dangerous, as is becoming clear in our time.
The very logic of life itself, carried to its extreme, shows the incapacity of such a society to
sustain itself. This logic is expressed in the command, “‘Be ye fruitful and multiply,’ in which it
is  as  though  the  voice  of  nature  herself  speaks  to  us.”289 Nature  demands  that  life  grow
indefinitely,  and if  death intervenes,  it  is  only so as to ensure the greater life  of the whole.
Human beings before the modern age did not heed this command, since they did not conceive of
themselves are solely natural or of immortality in terms of the species—the public realm kept the
life process confined to the private sphere. 
However,  what  has  become clear  in  recent  history is  that  when humans reject  their
worldliness and devote themselves wholeheartedly to growth, we are exceptionally skilled. Our
labouring is employed to the highest capacity, dedicated to deriving as much surplus as possible.
Thus, “only when the vita activa had lost its point of reference in the vita contemplativa could it
become active life in the full sense of the word; and only because this active life remained bound
to life as its only point of reference could  life as such, the laboring metabolism of man with
nature, become active and unfold its entire fertility.”290 Human beings, by contrast with other
natural things,  require  their  worldly activities to keep their  growth in check. While  life was
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immortal  in  a  spiritual  sense,  where  infinitude  is  possible,  there  was  no inherent  danger  of
overgrowing our impact beyond the regenerative capacity of the natural environment. But the
primacy of life in a this-worldly sense could only lead to ecological catastrophe. In the situation
of one overly successful species, the ecosystem collapses, and the successful species itself must
move on to a new system or perish. Ecosystem exhaustion is what spawned imperialism in the
nineteenth century and it is what human civilization as whole, understood in this light, is at risk
of doing. Only,  at  present,  it  has nowhere else to go. Modelling itself  so strictly on the life
process, it has ignored that to be too successful at living is to damn oneself in the long run.
Saving Lives
When natural processes progressively cease yielding ever-greater resources and goods, and when
lives stubbornly continue giving way to death,  drastic measures are taken to redesign nature
according to our need for more life. The new age in which we now live deploys the capacity to
mould nature, with which totalitarianism had experimented in order to produce its ideological
fantasy, instead to take the pre-totalitarian demands for infinite expansion to new heights. To do
so, it must re-make natural existence without death. If conservation spells the end of the social
life  process,  it  does  not  follow that  things  are  allowed  to  die.  For  death  is  not  opposed  to
worldliness, but to life. Death is to life what conservation is to production. Conservation is not
the same as staying alive; it is a form of durability, which like death is an end to a particular
process—production in the first case, life in the second. What must be maintained is the process
itself.  This obsession with denying things the ability  to  die  is  visible  in  the proliferation of
vintage and retro fashions, the endless collection of artifacts in museums and archives, and the
fascination  with  digitizing  or  digitally  recording every aspect  of  human life,  none of  which
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reasserts worldliness, but instead feeds individual patterns of consumption (as they are used in
our society). But most of all, it is clear in the obsessive need to keep people alive at all costs. 291
To this  end,  our  society  has  implemented  the  capacity  to  “act  into  nature,”  with  which  the
contemporary age began. 
The modern scientific endeavour, which, as we have seen, began with Galileo, is rooted
in  the  conviction  that  we can  only  know that  which  we have  made.  Over  a  long series  of
experiments, this conviction led to the discovery of ways of not only making that which nature
makes in order to understand it, but to release processes wholly alien to earthly nature. Arendt
sums up this history as follows:
This  started harmlessly enough with the experiment  in  which men were no
longer  content to observe,  to register,  and contemplate whatever nature was
willing to yield in her own appearance, but began to prescribe conditions and to
provoke natural processes. What then developed into an ever-increasing skill in
unchaining elemental processes, which, without the interference of men, would
have lain dormant and perhaps never have come to pass, has finally ended in a
veritable art of ‘making’ nature, that is, of creating ‘natural’ processes which
without  men  would  never  exist  and  which  earthly  nature  by  herself  seems
incapable  of  accomplishing,  although  similar  or  identical  processes  may be
commonplace phenomena in the universe surrounding the earth. Through the
introduction of the experiment, in which we prescribed man-thought conditions
to  natural  processes  and  forced  them  to  fall  into  man-made  patterns,  we
eventually learned how to ‘repeat the process that goes on in the sun,’ that is,
how to win from natural processes on the earth those energies which without us
develop only in the universe.292 
Arendt calls this new art “action into nature,” for “the actual underlying human capacity which
alone could bring about this development is no ‘theoretical’ capacity, neither contemplation nor
reason,  but  the  human  ability  to  act—to start  new unprecedented  processes  whose  outcome
remains  uncertain and unpredictable  whether  they are let  loose  in  the human or  the natural
291 The refusal of contemporary society to accept death and mourning is beautifully explored in Adam Phillips’s 
Darwin’s Worms (2001). However, the qualitative distinctions (of race, gender, etc.) that remain enforced within 
the contemporary definition of life are ignored here as in Arendt’s work. See Introduction. 
292 HC 231. 
96
realm.”293 Space exploration and nuclear technology are among her  usual  examples for these
actions that set off processes that introduce to terrestrial existence processes whose outcomes are
utterly unknown. 
In my view, this definition can be expanded to numerous other technologies. The key
idea here is that the natural processes triggered by our new technologies “without men never
would come into existence.” As Arendt points out, “this is a far cry from ‘cultivating,’ ‘breeding,’
domesticating wild animals, in brief from agricultural activities where we follow the hints of
nature  and by ‘imitating’ her  prepare  the  earth  for  the  use  of  men.”294 Unlike  the  activities
explored in chapter 1, these actions do not merely prepare nature to make a space for our world,
redirecting or replicating nature’s own processes for our purposes, but introduce new processes
that would not exist on earth at all without us. Examples include genetically modified organisms,
telecommunications,  and medical  life-support systems. In each of these technologies,  earthly
nature is re-made so as to allow for more life than could be possible without us. Yet, though their
outcomes could not have been predicted at their beginnings, we are now starting to see some of
the boomerang effects  of these endeavours.  As Arendt  reminds us,  “if,  therefore,  by starting
natural processes, we have begun to act into nature, we have manifestly begun to carry our own
unpredictability into that realm which we used to think of as ruled by inexorable laws.”295 Thus,
GMO crops may be contributing to the erosion of topsoil, the reduction in biodiversity, and the
deterioration of genes in humans who eat them. 
Likewise, information technology, which lately has been at the frontiers of history- and
nature-making action, rewriting the possibilities available to human beings, seeks to expand the
very ether into an infinitely growing domain of knowledge and communication, so that each life
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can at the same time experience all other lives. This growth in a “virtual” realm is believed to be
indefinite, since ideas by nature are endlessly replicable. But what we forget is that ideas need to
be stored when they are not in use, if they are to remain available to perpetual circulation. Books
were the low-tech, still place-bound repository of ideas that first replaced the human mind as a
repository for information. In the digital age, these have been replaced by servers, which in order
to function require constant energy and material inputs, and in order to circulate to any place in
the world require vast physical and energetic infrastructure. The erection of these networks, in
my view, constitute an action into nature by which we redesign the very landscape of the earth
and  its  orbit  to  better  serve  our  information  technologies.  But  they  are  most  definitely  still
material, and their effects are notable in the radiation they emit, the heat pollution they exude, the
sound vibrations that infringe on their surroundings, and the electricity they consume (leaving
aside their various political, social, and economic effects). 
However, some of the more persistent problems emerge from the deployment of social
and medical engineering to preserve human lives at all costs. Our society acts on the assumption
that human beings should in theory live forever, and that death is an unspeakable abomination
that must be exorcised. This is not the fear of death that recognizes that each individual death is a
loss of an utterly unique individual, but the attempted recuperation of an abstract phenomenon,
life, which permeates each of us and which must be shielded from the accident that is death. We
do not save people, we “save lives.” The first and highest priority of society is to save lives from
that which interrupts an otherwise infinite growth. Vast amounts of debt are accrued to preserve
human lives, which is functionally theft from future generations so long as we do not spend that
debt  restoring  or  regenerating  the  natural  processes  and  resources  we  consume.  Social
technologies are employed to restrict and sway the movements of people in order to quarantine
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those with contagious illnesses from others. The hyper-medicalization of human life introduces
pharmaceutical  and  biotechnological  elements  into  everyday  existence  whose  material  side-
effects on the human body are frequently unknown, as was asbestos at an earlier time. (Even
funeral arrangements are designed to refuse nature the reabsorbtion of the human body, as in the
burial of air-tight, metal casks.) Thus, through several devices, what once was seen as a natural
part of existence, namely death, is banished altogether. Human nature is being remade so as to
exclude death,  at  any expense—“nothing is  off  the  table” as  our  politicians  remind us.  The
environmental consequences of a species that is not allowed to die remain to be seen. 
Momentum
Society,  a  natural  species  whose  only  prerogative  is  to  maintain  its  life  process,  and  the
concomitant specialization of the capacity for action into the domain of science for the same sole
purpose,  is  the  form  taken  by  human  beings  whose  highest  good  is  life.  Within  society’s
perspective, it cannot be said that this way of doing things is wrong, for the determinant of right
and wrong is the model of the good that is employed, which in this case is life above all else. If
what we wanted was more life, we have been successful, and even the loss of other life forms, or
the eventual extinction of the species homo sapiens, could not take that away. More life is not the
same as living-forever, a goal we finally abandoned with the loss of faith in an afterlife, but
rather the attitude expressed in the saying YOLO—you only live once.296 If human beings are
going to become extinct anyway, who cares when it happens? We may as well do as much as we
can now, for no other reason than that we can. 
296 It is not surprising, then, that the artist who popularized the word YOLO would eventually release an album 
called More Life. 
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However,  Hannah  Arendt  teaches  us  to  think  through  these  matters,  which  means
engaging in  a  dialogue that  bounces  this  perspective against  others.  From an environmental
perspective, we discover sets of unanticipated, and deeply problematic, consequences deriving
from this arrangement. The environmental crisis, or the various environmental issues that add up
to a crisis, reveals to us that the answer to the question “what is the highest good” cannot be life
if we wish to impart a habitable world to our descendants or to mitigate the violence we do to
other natural beings. If we desire instead to rediscover or invent new standards for the shape the
world is to take, we must ensure that these become clear in the manner by which we go about
making them happen. That is to say, we must engage all our worldly capacities to bring about a
world in which we are satisfied to live—and to die. Before approaching considerations for how
this might be possible, it is first important to conclude this section on contemporary fascination
with life with an analysis of the obstacles we might encounter by trying to displace a dominant
model of human society that has acquired the momentum of life itself.297 
The first, most obvious and yet quite implacable, obstacle to changing the current state
of affairs is that, as society has monopolized the labour of all, it has divorced each person from
the actual fruits  of labour,  so that the vast  majority of people are dependent on the national
economic system for their livelihood. Very few are those who labour directly and enjoy the fruits
of  their  labour,  and thus  the  maintenance of  their  lives,  without  passing through the social-
economic system. In our society, suppression of dissent is unnecessary, since everyone depends
on the system and is therefore unlikely to overturn it.298 Consequently, challenging this system
must either be preceded by creating the conditions by which everyone is capable of living either
297 “Life finds a way,” as Jeff Goldblum’s character states in Jurassic Park. 
298 By this, I don’t mean that changes in the power dynamic will be allowed, for of course those in power which to 
stay that way. When the marginalized seek to displace the powerful, they will naturally be suppressed. But ideas 
which fundamentally challenge the nature of the system, such as Arendt’s, are allowed to disseminate without 
any real fear of change.
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directly from labour or through non-official means of obtaining a livelihood—which is extremely
unlikely, as society has everything to gain by making sure this does not happen and deploys the
instruments of violence to ensure it does not—or else it must be accompanied by the loss of
lives. This in itself is an extraordinary impediment, since even those who wish to abolish the
system are often still  under the sway of life as the highest good. If we mean to replace this
system by another which is still configured for the sole purpose of maintaining the life process,
we will be unwilling to sacrifice lives to get there. Getting clear then about what it is we want
and how we are willing to get there, including the sacrifices it will entail, is a first step.299 
The second obstacle is that action in the present state of affairs is increasingly confined
to  a  small  group  of  experts,  so  that  the  decisions  to  unleash  a  process  are  not  arrived  at
politically, that is by collective deliberation about why we would want to do so. As Arendt notes,
“the action of the scientists, since it acts into nature from the standpoint of the universe and not
into the web of human relationships, lacks the revelatory character of action as well as the ability
to  produce  stories  and  become historical,  which  together  form the  very  source  from which
meaningfulness  springs  into  and  illuminates  human  existence.  In  this  existentially  most
important aspect, action, too, has become an experience for the privileged few, and these few
who still know what it means to act may well be even fewer than the artists, their experience
even rarer than the genuine experience of and love for the world.”300 Instead, political decisions
are often only considered according to the calculus of life; how many lives they will save or
support. To the extent that ordinary citizens are willing to protest these decisions, and therefore
exercise their capacity for action, they frequently fall into the trap of simply demanding further
or  more  stringent  life-ensuring  decisions  from the  professional  decision-makers.  What  must
299 Arendt provides some examples of alternative political goals which she believes are untenable, such as 
compassion. What is desirable is a manner for collective deliberation.
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instead be demanded is the right to self-organize, the assurance that we are all welcome to enter
the political sphere and to contribute our voices and be heard in conversations about decisions
that affect us all,  yet cannot be reduced to mere administration or mathematics. This is what
Arendt promotes in her discussions on councils, the “lost treasure of the revolution,” which as of
yet have never been given sufficient space to be tried out, threatening as they are to formal
government.301 There are many ways to address climate change; the important thing is to ensure
that the choice of solutions is arrived at politically.
A third threat to authentic politics from the current arrangement is that, in “action into
nature,” a key component of political action is lost, namely that of forgiveness. In the human
sphere,  a  process  can  be  interrupted  or  negated  by  means  of  forgiveness.  For  Arendt,  “the
possible redemption from the predicament of irreversibility—of being unable to undo what one
has done though one did not, and could not, have known what he was doing—is the faculty of
forgiving.”302 Forgiveness is the means by which one is released from the chain of reactions that
are sparked by the beginning of a new process, and it can only be spoken by the person who is
affected by the action. In nature, which is speechless, a process that is unleashed cannot be called
back. Nature does not listen and natural processes are irrevocable. As Arendt writes, “because the
remedies against the enormous strength and resiliency inherent in action processes can function
only under the condition of plurality, it is very dangerous to use this faculty in any but the realm
of  human  affairs.  Modern  natural  science  and technology,  which  no longer  observe  or  take
material from or imitate processes of nature but seem actually to act into it, seem, by the same
token, to have carried irreversibility and human unpredictability into the natural realm, where no
remedy can be found to undo what has been done.”303 Consequently, political action now must
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learn to act within and through a planet that has been dramatically altered by human actions; that
is, it  must learn how to operate without the possibility for forgiveness, and this means being
much more attentive and conscientious. This is no longer the politics of ancient Greece, where
people could happily show off all their great words and deeds, sure that any offence would be
forgiven. It is a more careful, gentle, and mature politics that accepts responsibility for actions
and tries to do better.
Finally, and most critically, the issue with establishing an authentic political space to
handle environmental issues as well as other goals for society is the very reason why life alone
has emerged as the driver of human activity: we are fundamentally mistrustful of appearances
and consequently all worldly reality is suspicious to us, so that the only certainty is the simple
fact of living. World alienation, indeed, lies both at the bottom of the environmental crisis as well
as our failure to understand that crisis. Without a confident sense of the changes occurring to the
natural environment, we rely on the findings of scientists to explain these phenomena. Yet the
findings themselves are on such a scale and of such a complexity that they tend to escape the
possibility  of  being  expressed  in  ordinary  language,  requiring  the  development  of  technical
languages inaccessible to most and which, by their nature, make assumptions about what we are
looking for and how to deal with it. Environmental issues, therefore, tend to preclude a multitude
of perspectives on a common world, replacing them with a multitude of interpretations of data,
behind  which  no  concrete  reality  is  ascertained.  They  therefore  preclude  human  plurality,
dispersing human beings into atomized individuals who attempt to cope each according to their
personal  interpretations,  and  unable  to  act  together  and  develop  political  power.304 This,  at
304 “Modern ‘history-making’ and contemporary ‘nature-making,’ both of which are in fact ways of acting, are 
initiations that exclude plurality. [...] ‘making’ nature has the effect of undermining the stability of the world, the
human artifice, and eventually the habitat of the earth itself” (Cooper 1988, 329). 
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bottom, is the crisis of understanding that lies behind the incredible failure to act human beings
have shown in the face of overwhelming signs that a collapse is impending. 
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CONCLUSION
If without action and speech, without the articulation of natality, we
would  be  doomed  to  swing  forever  in  the  ever-recurring  cycle  of
becoming, then without the faculty to undo what we have done and to
control at least partially the processes we have let loose, we would be
the victims of  an automatic  necessity  bearing all  the marks of the
inexorable laws which, according to the natural sciences before our
time,  were  supposed to  constitute  the  outstanding characteristic  of
natural processes.305
Perhaps the surest sign of the sorry state of politics today is an almost universal contempt for
promises. Politicians are frequently thought of as nothing else than someone who makes “empty
promises.”  Broken treaties  define  the  relationships  of  national  governments  with  Indigenous
peoples living on the same territory.  And governments consistently fail  to  meet  the goals to
which they commit themselves at any number of summits and conventions. Yet for Arendt, the
faculty of promising is among the chief political capacities available to human beings. Arendt
provides several activities which she deems inherently political, insofar as they are predicated on
human plurality (judgment, imagination, speech, great achievements, etc.), but promising is, with
forgiveness, the only faculty that “redeems” action as a whole.306 Without being able to make
promises, our actions would constantly escape us and we would be swept up in them as we are in
natural forces. Promises are what make the realm of politics free. 
By making promises,  we bind our future selves to  the commitments  we make now,
thereby  ensuring  a  continuity  of  identity  between  who  one  is  today  and  who  one  will  be
tomorrow, and further we organize and control the enormous capacity of human beings to begin
305 HC 246. 
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new things. Thus, “the function of the faculty of promising is to master this two-fold darkness of
human affairs and is, as such, the only alternative to a mastery which relies on domination of
one’s self and rule over others; it corresponds exactly to the existence of a freedom which was
given under the condition of non-sovereignty.”307 By making promises, we are able to ensure that
a person’s actions are in tune with a community of fellow actors, rather than each interrupting
everyone else’s. We can achieve more through promises, because they enable us to work together
toward  a  common goal  that  we could  not  achieve  acting  separately.  As  Arendt  writes,  “we
mentioned before the power generated when people gather together and ‘act in concert,’ which
disappears the moment they depart. The force that keeps them together, as distinguished from the
space  of  appearances  in  which they gather  and the  power  which  keeps  this  public  space  in
existence, is the force of mutual promise or contract.”308 While a human network of peers is all
that is needed to act individually, promises are required to act in concert. 
In my view, this redemptive faculty is perhaps the most direly needed tool we have at
our disposal to address the environmental crisis. In concluding this paper, I want to explore some
ideas for how a kind of “covenantal politics,” inspired by Arendt’s more hopeful ideas, can be
employed on pressing environmental issues today. Arendt herself is famously not forthcoming on
practical solutions to the problems she outlines. At one time, describing the loss of tradition
which has accompanied the gradual rise of world alienation and the eventual collapse of the
modern age, she was accused by a critic of dwelling on problems. She responded with the idea
that it could actually be a positive opportunity: 
He  concludes  with  construing  as  a  “dilemma”  what  actually  is  a  factual
description and was meant as a hopeful one. Since tradition and authority have
broken down, I said, we are “confronted anew…without the protection of self-
evident standards of behavior…by the elementary problems of human living-
307 HC 244. 
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together.” [...] For him this constitutes a “dilemma”—for me it is no more than
a challenge, albeit a serious one.309
In  Arendt’s  work,  there  are  no  easy  solutions,  and  no  simplification  either.  For  me,  the
environmental crisis is a crisis in the concept of nature, but this too can be a challenge and an
opportunity. With this in mind, I here sketch out some broad lines for a possible course of action,
trusting that the details will, necessarily, have to be filled out by those who undertake to resolve
issues that concern their particular communities. I join to the end of this outline some examples I
have come across of communities who have done just this work. 
A covenantal politics can not only join people together for particular actions, but can in
fact act as the foundation of a political community that makes responsible approaches to human
engagements with nature possible. I take as my cue in making such a claim a historical event
analyzed by Arendt in On Revolution. In this unprecedented event, a group of people who faced a
bewildering and intimidating encounter with “wilderness”—nature unprepared by human beings
for the establishment of a world—made a pact to one another that would found not only mutual
respect and support, but a political structure in which direct engagement was available to all. The
event in question was the Mayflower Compact and the political institution it founded were the
town-hall meetings. (That this event occurred during the colonization of America, and neglected
the fact that the “wilderness” had in fact been home to Indigenous peoples for thousands of years
is an issue, but not for the argument. For what matters is that the landscape was a wilderness to
them, who indeed had never seen the landscape at the time of making the pact, and still they were
able to found a political community in the midst of it.) Arendt’s astonishing reading of this event
is as follows: 
Power—as the men of the American Revolution understood it as a matter of
course  because  it  was  embodied  in  all  institutions  of  self-government
309 D. 
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throughout the country—was not only prior to the Revolution, it was in a sense
prior to the colonization of the continent. The Mayflower Compact was drawn
up on the ship and signed upon landing. For our argument, it is perhaps of no
great relevance, though it would be interesting to know whether the Pilgrims
had been prompted to ‘covenant’ because of the bad weather which prevented
their landing farther south within the jurisdiction of the Virginia Company that
had  granted  them  their  patent,  or  whether  they  felt  the  need  ‘to  combine
themselves  together’ because  the  London  recruits  were  an  ‘undesirable  lot’
challenging the jurisdiction of the Virginia Company and threatening to ‘use
their owne libertie.’ In either case, they obviously feared the so-called state of
nature,  the  untrod  wilderness,  unlimited  by  any  boundary,  as  well  as  the
unlimited initiative of men bound by no law. [...] The really astounding fact in
the whole story is that their obvious fear of one another was accompanied by
the  no  less  obvious  confidence  they  had  in  their  own  power,  granted  and
confirmed by no one and as yet  unsupported by any means of  violence,  to
combine themselves together into a ‘civil Body Politick’ which, held together
solely  by  the  strength  of  mutual  promise  ‘in  the  Presence  of  God and one
another’, supposedly was powerful enough to ‘enact, constitute, and frame’ all
necessary laws and instruments of government.310
The  town-hall  meetings  were  created  to  allow a  space  for  those  who had  entered  into  this
compact  to  discuss  and shape the  laws that  would govern  their  society,  as  well  as  to  make
decisions  about  specific  initiatives.  Arendt  calls  these  meetings  “the  original  springs  of  all
political activity in the country,” for it was there that the early Americans learned about action
and developed a taste for democratic politics that would inform the Constitution of the future
United States.311 They are fundamentally akin to the council system, the only political system
Arendt  seems  to  have  endorsed  unequivocally,  which  spontaneously  emerges  in  revolutions
throughout  the  world,  but  which  are  unfortunately  quickly  dismantled  by the  power-hungry.
What is significant for me is that these councils succeeded especially when they were formed
without reference to a higher body, and explicitly in order to create a shelter for human action
surrounded by an  unmitigated  natural  landscape.  They are  designed for  the  sole  purpose of
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preventing human collectivity from existing within a state of nature and are dedicated to the
specifically human, political capacity for action. 
In our time, as conventional politics has become the handmaiden of society and largely
serves the life process, it seems as though we face a dual wilderness: that of mass-society and
that of the natural realm into which we have acted with unpredictable results. It is not likely, nor
has it ever been, that a political space can fully resist or dominate these natural forces. This
dream is  one  we  must  abandon,  since  it  is  based  on  an  exteriorization  of  nature.  Instead,
covenantal  politics  must  be  based  on  non-violent  and  non-coercive  organization.  This
requirement was discovered by the early Americans in their journey. Arendt speculates that they
may have been informed by their knowledge of the covenants that founded the ancient nation of
Israel, writing that “if there was any theoretical influence that contributed to the compacts and
agreements  in  early  American  history,  it  was,  of  course,  the  Puritans’ reliance  on  the  Old
Testament.”312 Indeed,  she  writes  elsewhere  that  “we  may  see  [the  political  faculty  of
promising’s] discoverer in Abraham, the man from Ur, whose whole story, as the Bible tells it,
shows such a passionate drive toward making covenants that it is as though he departed from his
country for no other reason than to try out the power of mutual promise in the wilderness of the
world, until eventually God himself agreed to make a Covenant with him.”313 But beyond the
influence of the Old Testament, which perhaps planted the idea in their heads, the reason it was
tried out at all was that the very nature of the event demanded it: “Nothing but the simple and
obvious insight into the elementary structure of joint enterprise as such, the need ‘for the better
encouragement of ourselves and others that shall joyne with us in this action’, caused these men
to become obsessed with the notion of compact and prompted them again and again ‘to promise
312 OR 172. 
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and bind’ themselves to one another.”314 They found that in a land surrounded by wilderness, their
only succour would be from acting together, without rulership and without a higher source of law
than the promise itself. This translates to the natural realm itself, regarding which, incidentally,
Arendt also appeals to the Bible, noting that “according to the Old Testament, man is the master
of all living creatures (Gen. 1), which were created to help him (2:19). But nowhere is he made
the lord and master of the earth; on the contrary, he was put into the garden of Eden to serve and
preserve it (2:15).”315 Thus, new political configurations intending to deal with environmental
issues must not seek to dominate the earth, but to find ways of  serving it that can be equally
conducive to building a world. 
We cannot however return to the innocence of pre-alienated trust in appearances. Arendt
is very clear that a return to the past of tradition is impossible. But if phenomenology can effect a
reconstruction  of  concepts  on  the  basis  of  appearance,  if  thought  now  (“between  past  and
future”316) has perhaps a better vantage point than ever, then perhaps promising is also better
suited now than ever to establish a new worldliness in action. It is, after all, in the promise that
the  Americans  first  discovered  their  political  enthusiasm,  which  would  translate  into  the
revolution,  and  “revolutions  are  the  only  political  events  which  confront  us  directly  and
inevitably with the problem of beginning.”317 Promises are useful because they are made in a state
of non-sovereignty, and this can apply equally to the not-knowing of contemporary alienation.
We can re-create a sense of worldliness by promising to trust our senses and the testimony of
others, by giving up the illusion of more correct information from technological sources and
demanding that scientific knowledge be translated to ordinary language. And most of all we must
314 OR 173. 
315 HC 139. 
316 BPF 12-15. 
317 OR 21. 
110
refuse to accept data as a guide for action; making use of it,  yet making sufficient space for
people to offer their own perspectives on what it means and how to act on it, so that decisions
can be made collectively. Promises are a choice to listen to others, fallible and different though
they  may  be,  rather  than  to  seek  for  optimal  solutions  derived  from  expert  or  computed
conclusions, which by definition deny the plurality of views on a given issue. Consequently, this
means adapting the concept of nature to mean the realm of being in which we share with all other
living beings, gleaned from appearance, while  also incorporating new scientific findings in a
way that doesn’t relinquish our plurality. 
A covenantal environmental politics will necessarily be small-scale. We cannot trust our
senses for those things that necessarily come to us by way of distance. Issues that are not directly
accessible to us cannot be understood except in terms of technical language. We will never truly
understand the issues of those across the world from us, and to attempt to solve them from here
is a form of domination. This does not preclude a community from dealing with larger issues by
combining  with  other  communities  with  whom environmental  boundaries  and  networks  are
intertwined. In fact, the covenantal council is ideally suited to collaboration, since “the mutual
contract  where  power  is  constituted  by  means  of  promise  contains  in  nuce [...]  the  federal
principle,  the  principle  of  ‘a  Commonwealth  for  increase’ (as  Harrington called  his  utopian
Oceana),  according to  which constituted political  bodies  can  combine and enter  into lasting
alliances without losing their identity.”318 Power is strengthened by joining with other powers, not
by one dominating the other. By creating an alliance, two communities can achieve greater things
than they could alone, so long as they do so in the form of a non-sovereign contract, just as
individuals do in the formation of a covenantal body. However, the original political body must
be maintained and focused on its small-scale domain. For a large body of territory, “obviously
318 OR 171. 
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direct democracy would not do, if only because ‘the room will not hold all’ (as John Selden,
more than a hundred years earlier, had described the chief cause for the birth of Parliament).” 319
But this is not conducive to the active elicitation of voices from all  who wish to partake in
political decision-making. Furthermore, large-scale politics tend to demand catch-all solutions
which are both unadapted to local conditions and issues, and negate the plurality of approaches
that must constitute a properly political relationship with nature. 
At this stage, these ideas are still extremely vague. That is because, in keeping with the
demand for plurality and specificity that this approach demands, no one shape can be prescribed
for  every  political  configuration  everywhere.  However,  there  is  good evidence  to  show that
communities  pursuing  activities  in  keeping  with  these  ideas  are  emerging  across  the  globe.
Elinor Ostrom showed long ago how powerful and sustainable self-governing commons-based
approaches to natural resource use could be.320 More recently, Anna Tsing has documented the
early signs of a “latent commons” approach of communities who seek livelihood in the “blasted
landscapes” that follow in the wake of capitalism (and, we might add, action into nature).321 And
Robin Wall  Kimmerer  has  begun to popularize ways in  which scientific  knowledges  can be
accommodated and integrated with traditional Indigenous knowledge systems based on what I
would call phenomenological approaches to nature.322 These are just some examples that I’ve
come across as I have been writing, but no doubt there are countless others. In my view, they
testify to sites in which explicit or implicit covenantal politics are developing as methods to deal
with small-scale environmental problems in the face of world alienation and the “natural” forces
of a labouring society. 
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In her communications with Mary McCarthy, Arendt noted that “if nature is dead culture
will die too, together with all the artifacts of our civilization.”323 Nature as that set of processes in
which all of life is included, cannot die so long as a single life form continues to exist, though it
can be altered by the introduction of new processes whose outcome is unknown. We cannot undo
those processes. But we can appreciate that nature continues to swing, even now, with a new
swirl. However, we have tasted our capacity to cause irrevocable damage to natural processes
and we know also that, even if nature is not killed, human civilization can be. The order of
dependence goes only one way. We also know that to be perfectly natural is for human beings a
threat to our own nature, as well as potentially to the life of numerous other beings. We must take
care in our relationships with nature in order to preserve that which gives meaning to our lives,
for love of the world, for even though we may mutilate a good part of nature, we will not kill it
short of actually destroying the planet. In times of precarity, due to the uncertain state of the
natural environment as well as the equally collapsing state of the society we have created in
mockery of it, promising can act as a way of banding together, creating our own security, and
allowing space for human beings to live out their full plurality. 
323 BF 293. 
113
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Works by Hannah Arendt (abbreviations)
BF (with Mary McCarthy.) 1995. Between Friends: The Correspondence of Hannah Arendt
and Mary McCarthy: 1949-1975. Edited and with an Introduction by Carol Brightman. 
New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.
BPF 1993 [1961]. Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought. New York:
Penguin Books.
CR 1972. Crises of the Republic. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
CAS (with Gershom Scholem.) 2017. The Correspondence of Hannah Arendt and Gershom 
Scholem. University of Chicago Press.
D 1970. “Distinctions” in The New York Review of Books, January 1, 1970. 
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1970/01/01/distinctions/.
EU 2005. Essays in Understanding, 1930-1954: Formation, Exile, and Totalitarianism. 
New York: Schocken. 
HA 1979. “On Hannah Arendt” in Hannah Arendt: The Recovery of the Public Realm. New 
York: St. Martin’s Press. 
HC 1989 [1958]. The Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
HTR 2005. “Home to Roost” in Responsibility and Judgment. New York: Schocken. 
LMT 1981. “Thinking” in The Life of the Mind. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
LMW 1981. “Willing” in The Life of the Mind. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
OR 2016 [1963]. On Revolution. London: Faber & Faber.
OT 1973 [1951]. The Origins of Totalitarianism. New Edition with Added Prefaces. New 
York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
OV 1969. On Violence. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
Secondary Sources on Arendt
Achterhuis, Hans. 1994. “The Lie of Sustainability.” In Ecology, Technology and Culture, edited 
by Wim Zweers and J. J. Boersema. Cambridge, UK: White Horse Press.
Borren, Marieke. 2010. Amor Mundi: Hannah Arendt’s Political Phenomenology of World. 
Amsterdam: F & N EigenBeheer.
Bowring, Finn. 2014. “Arendt after Marx: Rethinking the Dualism of Nature and World.” 
Rethinking Marxism 26 (2): 278–90. https://doi.org/10.1080/08935696.2014.888856.
114
Butler, Ryan Edgar. 2017. “Between Nature and Artifice: Hannah Arendt and Environmental 
Politics.” MA diss., University of Victoria. 
Cannavò, Peter. 2014. “Hannah Arendt: Place, World, and Earthly Nature.” In Engaging Nature: 
Environmentalism and the Political Theory Canon, edited by Peter F. Cannavò and 
Joseph H. Lane, Jr., 253–70. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Canovan, Margaret. 1998. “Introduction.” In The Human Condition, by Hannah Arendt, 2nd ed., 
vii–xx. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Chapman, Anne. 2004. “Technology as World Building.” Ethics, Place & Environment 7 (1–2): 
59–72. https://doi.org/10.1080/1366879042000264778.
———. 2007. “The Ways That Nature Matters: The World and the Earth in the Thought of 
Hannah Arendt.” Environmental Values 16 (4): 433–45. 
https://doi.org/10.3197/096327107X243222.
Constable, Marianne. 2013. “The Rhetoric of Sustainability: Human, All Too Human.” HA: The 
Journal of the Hannah Arendt Center for Politics and Humanities at Bard College 1: 
155–68.
Cooper, Barry. 1988. “Action into Nature: Hannah Arendt’s Reflections on Technology.” In 
Democratic Theory and Technological Society, edited by Richard B. Day, Ronald 
Beiner and Joseph Masciulli, 316–35. London: Routledge.
Crease, Robert P. 2017. “Arendt and the Authority of Science in Politics:” Arendt Studies 1: 43–
60. https://doi.org/10.5840/arendtstudies20176191.
Donohoe, Janet. 2017. “Edmund Husserl, Hannah Arendt and a Phenomenology of Nature.” In 
Phenomenology and the Primacy of the Political, edited by Véronique M. Fóti and 
Pavlos Kontos, 175–88. New York: Springer.
Drucker, Claudia. 1998. “Hannah Arendt on the Need for a Public Debate on Science.” 
Environmental Ethics 20: 305–16.
Greear, Jake P. 2016. “Hannah Arendt and the Geopolitics of Ecology.” In The Ashgate Research
Companion to Modern Theory, Modern Power, World Politics, edited by Nevzat Soguk 
and Scott G Nelson, 89–104. London: Routledge.
Hargis, Jill. 2016. “Hannah Arendt’s Turn to the Self and Environmental Responses to Climate 
Change Paralysis.” Environmental Politics 25 (3): 475–93. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2015.1106423.
Heuer, Wolfgang. 2019. “Cosmos and Republic: A Hidden Dialogue between Hannah Arendt and
Alexander von Humboldt.” Sotsiologicheskoe Obozrenie / Russian Sociological Review 
18 (4): 284–98. https://doi.org/10.17323/1728-192x-2019-4-284-298.
Hinchman, Lewis P., and Sandra K. Hinchman. 1984. “In Heidegger’s Shadow: Hannah Arendt’s
Phenomenological Humanism.” The Review of Politics 46 (2): 183–211. https://doi.org/
10.1017/S0034670500047720.
115
Kring, Elizabeth. 2020. “Spaces of appearance; Intergenerational and interspecies relations in the
Anthropocene.” PhD diss., Stockholm University. 
Macauley, David. 1992. “Out of Place and Outer Space: Hannah Arendt on Earth Alienation: An 
Historical and Critical Perspective.” Capitalism Nature Socialism 3 (4): 19–45. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10455759209358517.
———. 1996. “Hannah Arendt and the Politics of Place: From Earth Alienation to Oikos.” In 
Minding Nature: The Philosophers of Ecology, edited by David Macauley, 102–33. New
York: The Guilford Press.
Ott, Paul. 2009. “World and Earth: Hannah Arendt and the Human Relationship to Nature.” 
Ethics, Place & Environment 12 (1): 1–16. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13668790902752999.
Robinson, Benjamin Lewis. 2018. “Between Future and Past: An Exercise in Political Ecology.” 
HannahArendt.net 9 (1): 1–12.
Sandilands, Catriona. 1999. The Good-Natured Feminist: Ecofeminism and the Quest for 
Democracy. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
———. 2014. “Acts of Nature: Literature, Excess, and Environmental Politics.” In Critical 
Collaborations: Indigeneity, Diaspora, and Ecology in Canadian Literary Studies, 
edited by Smaro Kamboureli and Christl Verduyn, 127–42. Waterloo, ON: Wilfird 
Laurier University Press. 
Smith, Mick. 2005. “Ecological Citizenship and Ethical Responsibility: Arendt, Benjamin and 
Political Activism.” Environments 33 (3): 51–63.
———. 2006. “Environmental Risks and Ethical Responsibilities: Arendt, Beck, and the Politics 
of Acting into Nature.” Environmental Ethics 28: 227–46.
Szerszynski, Bronislaw. 2003. “Technology, Performance and Life Itself: Hannah Arendt and the 
Fate of Nature.” The Sociological Review 51 (2 supplement): 203–18. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-954X.2004.00459.x.
Taminiaux, Jacques. 1996. “Bios Politikos and Bios Theoretikos in the Phenomenology of 
Hannah Arendt.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 4 (2): 215–32.
Torgerson, Douglas. 1999. The Promise of Green Politics: Environmentalism and the Public 
Sphere. Durham: Duke University Press.
———. 2000. “Farewell to the Green Movement? Political Action and the Green Public 
Sphere.” Environmental Politics 9 (4): 1–19.
Undurraga, Beltran. 2016. “Amor Mundi: Politics, Democracy, and TechoScience.” PhD diss., 
UCLA.
Vatter, Miguel. 2006. “NATALITY AND BIOPOLITICS IN HANNAH ARENDT.” Revista de 
Ciencia Política (Santiago) 26 (2): 137–59. https://doi.org/10.4067/S0718-
090X2006000200008.
116
Voice, Paul. 2013. “Consuming the World: Hannah Arendt on Politics and the Environment.” 
Journal of International Political Theory 9 (2): 178–93. 
https://doi.org/10.3366/jipt.2013.0054.
Whiteside, Kerry H. 1994. “Hannah Arendt and Ecological Politics:” Environmental Ethics 16 
(4): 339–58. https://doi.org/10.5840/enviroethics19941642.
———. 1998. “Worldliness and Respect for Nature: An Ecological Appreciation of Hannah 
Arendt’s Conception of Culture.” Environmental Values 7 (1): 25–40.
Yaqoob, Waseem. 2014. “The Archimedean Point: Science and Technology in the Thought of 
Hannah Arendt, 1951–1963.” Journal of European Studies 44 (3): 199–224. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0047244114532220.
Young-Bruehl, Elisabeth. 1982. Hannah Arendt; For Love of the World. New Haven: Yale 
University Press.
Additional sources
Augustine, Saint. 1995. Against the Academicians and The Teacher. Indianapolis: Hackett.
Dupuy, Jean-Pierre. 1982. Ordres et Désordres. Paris: Seuil. 
Franklin, Ursula. 2004. The Real World of Technology. Revised edition. Toronto: House of 
Anansi.
Illich, Ivan. 2015. Life As Idol. Podcast. Ivan Illich in Conversation. Toronto: DavidCayley.com. 
http://www.davidcayley.com/podcasts/2015/4/19/life-as-idol.
Kimmerer, Robin Wall. 2013. Braiding Sweetgrass: Indigenous Wisdom, Scientific Knowledge 
and the Teachings of Plants. Minneapolis: Milkweed Editions.
Leys, Simon. 2011. The Hall of Uselessness: Collected Essays. New York: New York Review 
Books.
Mbembé, J.-A.. 2003. “Necropolitics.” Translated by Libby Meintjes. Public Culture 15 (1): 11-
40. https://www.muse.jhu.edu/article/39984.
McCarthy, Mary. 1970. “One Touch of Nature.” In The Writing on the Wall and Other Literary 
Essays, 189–213. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.
———. 1971. Birds of America. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
McKibben, Bill. 1989. The End of Nature. New York: Random House.
Oliver, Paul. 2006. “The Importance of the Study of Vernacular Architecture (1993).” In Built to 
Meet Needs: Cultural Issues in Vernacular Architecture, 17–26. Oxford: Architectural 
Press.
Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective 
Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
117
Robinson, Kim Stanley. 1996. Red Mars. London: Voyager.
———. 2020. “The Coronavirus Is Rewriting Our Imaginations.” The New Yorker, May 1, 2020.
https://www.newyorker.com/culture/annals-of-inquiry/the-coronavirus-and-our-future.
Trouillard, Jean. Forthcoming. The Plotinian Purification. Translated by Elizabeth Curry-King 
and Philippe Mesly. Stuttgart: Tetraktys Press.
Tsing, Anna Lowenhaupt. 2015. The Mushroom at the End of the World: On the Possibility of 
Life in Capitalist Ruins. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Wright, Robin. 2020. “How Loneliness from Coronavirus Isolation Takes Its Toll.” The New 
Yorker, March 23, 2020. https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/how-
loneliness-from-coronavirus-isolation-takes-its-own-toll.
Wynter, Sylvia. 2003. “Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom: Towards the 
Human, After Man, Its Overrepresentation--An Argument.” CR: The New Centennial 
Review 3 (3): 257–337. https://doi.org/10.1353/ncr.2004.0015.
Xenophon. 2013. Memorabilia; Oeconomicus; Symposium; Apology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press.
118
